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I.

INTRODUCTION

The opportunity to own one’s home has long been considered part and
parcel of the American Dream. Homeownership, so it is contended,
provides a pathway to upward mobility, fosters good citizenship, and is a
reliable form of long-term savings.1 Even in the wake of the recent
foreclosure crisis, a complex phenomenon in which homes plunged millions
of American households into financial distress, the nation has by and large
kept the faith in homeownership.2
For the last century, the federal government has unabashedly promoted
homeownership. It supports credit markets to help make home mortgages
affordable, offers counseling and financial assistance to prospective low
income homebuyers, and, most pertinent to this article, provides a
collection of income tax breaks directly to homeowners. These tax breaks
(which this article will refer to as “homeowner subsidies”) are no small
matter. In 2017 alone, it is estimated that the three principal homeowner
subsidies—the mortgage interest deduction, the property tax deduction and
the exclusion of home sale capital gains—will total $135 billion in forgone
tax revenue.3 This amounts to the country’s second largest tax expenditure,
1
See, e.g., Social Benefits of Homeownership and Stable Housing, NATIONAL ASS’N OF
REALTORS (April 2012), https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/migration_files/socialbenefits-of-stable-housing-2012-04.pdf.
2
Eric S. Belsky, The Dream Lives On: The Future of Homeownership in America 2
(Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud. of Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 13-1, 2013),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/w13-1_belsky_0.pdf.
3
H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, S. COMM. ON FINANCE, AND STAFF OF THE J.
COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2016-2020, at 33 (Comm. Print 2017) [hereinafter 2017 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET].
It is worth pointing out that Congressional estimates of forgone revenue associated with
homeowner subsidies, while useful in understanding their costs, are not equal to the gain to
the federal budget that would result if Congress eliminated the subsidies. Taxpayer behavior
would change to some extent upon elimination of the subsidies. See, e.g., JOINT ECON.
COMM., 106TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1, 8 (Comm. Print
1999). For example, a homeowner might move less frequently if she faced the prospect of
capital gains tax on each sale.
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and nearly triple what Congress budgeted for the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development and all of its programs in 2017.4 The
subsidies are premised on the rationale that homeownership is a good
investment for homeowners and also creates spillover benefits for those
who live around them (what are known as “positive externalities” 5) because
homeowners take better care of their properties and are more invested and
involved in their communities.6 Therefore, it is a choice that ought to be
encouraged.
A great deal of criticism has already been directed at the homeowner
subsidies for failing to do what they are ostensibly meant to accomplish. A
veritable phalanx of economists, policy analysts, and academics have
dissected and assailed the subsidies, contending that they neither increase
the country’s overall homeownership rate nor cause those who are on the
fence about or face financial barriers to purchasing a home to do so.7
Instead, the primary effect of the subsidies appears to be to encourage those
higher income households that would already buy homes to buy larger and
more expensive ones.8 Perversely, they may even drive up home prices in
those supply-limited housing markets where home affordability is most
problematic.9 These outcomes are due to some serious design defects in the
subsidies and have led to a groundswell of calls for their reform so that they
are better engineered to address the home affordability concerns of
prospective low and middle income homebuyers.10
As this article will contend, the homeowner subsidies are problematic in
another way that has attracted much less attention. While homeowner
decisions can benefit those other than the homeowner, so too can they
impose costs on others (“negative externalities”11). For example, a steady
exodus of prospective home buyers from less affluent communities to more
affluent and exclusive ones can decimate income tax bases and property
values in the less affluent communities, making the marginalized
populations left behind financially and otherwise much worse off. Home
4

See U.S. Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD’s Proposed 2017 Budget (2017),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/PROPOSEDFY17FACTSHEET.PDF.
5
A positive externality occurs when one party’s actions make another party better off,
but the first party is not compensated for causing this benefit. See, e.g., JONATHAN GRUBER,
PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 128 (4th ed. 2013).
6
See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction 22-24 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9284, 2002.).
7
See infra Part III.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
A negative externality occurs when one party’s actions make another party worse off,
but the first party does not bear the cost of doing so. See, e.g., GRUBER, supra note 5, at 124.

206

University of Hawai‘i Law Review / Vol. 40:1

purchases in newly built developments on greenspace far away from urban
job centers can heighten damage to the environment, harming both present
and future generations, through increased carbon emissions, decreased
biodiversity, and watershed destruction.
Just as a housing decision might have positive and negative
consequences for others (“housing externalities”), so are federal policies
related to housing concerned with more than simply its availability. To
varying degrees and at considerable expense, federal policies act to contain
or offset negative housing externalities, especially those that impose
significant or concentrated costs on others.12 These policies are wideranging and evolving, and include: (i) ameliorating blight, deterioration and
public health threats in disinvested communities, (ii) decreasing economic
and racial housing segregation, and (iii) lessening environmental
degradation that results from housing choices, while reducing the
vulnerability of those who reside in environmental hotspots.13
The problem is that the homeowner subsidies are profoundly
disconnected from these other policies and the negative housing
externalities they seek to contain. The homeowner subsidies are facially
neutral with respect to the location and type of home one lives in, rewarding
homeownership decisions at large (assuming that a homeowner is affluent
enough to benefit from them).14 So, the subsidies do not aid in ameliorating
these negative housing externalities, each of which bears some relationship
to homeowner decisions about home location and type. Furthermore, as this
article will explain, the subsidies actually encourage to some degree
homeowner decisions that exacerbate these externalities.15 In other words,
the government pays for housing consumption that, at best, does little to
support and, at worst, actually undermines several of its other key housing
related policies.
Why the disconnect? Homeowner decisions are complex. So is the
nation’s housing market, which actually consists of thousands of much
smaller local markets and submarkets that vary, sometimes dramatically, in
their strengths and weaknesses. The homeowner subsidies, on the other
hand, are simplistic and monolithic. This article offers three explanations
for this design: an idealization of homeownership, administrative
simplicity, and political intransigence.16 The end result is that the
homeowner subsidies have come to operate like entitlements, reserved
primarily for higher income homeowners, rather than strategic investments
12
13
14
15
16

See infra Part IV.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part V.
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capable of advancing multiple housing objectives. Meanwhile, lacking a
demand-side supplement capable of meaningfully influencing homeowner
behavior, federal policies meant to address negative housing externalities
reflect a half-hearted, crisis management mentality rather than proactively
seeking to contain them.
In addition to shining a light on this disconnect, this article explores
whether “smarter” homeowner subsidies might be devised to lessen it.17
Assuming that Congress chooses to continue financially inducing American
households to own homes, it seems sensible to ask whether Congress can
leverage these inducements to simultaneously encourage choices that
impose fewer costs on others. As a starting point, this article offers a
definition of smarter subsidies as those that are more precisely targeted,
externality sensitive, and capable of adaptation across multiple housing
submarkets. It then looks for lessons from the body of public finance
research that has emerged on the experiences of state and local government
in targeting demand-side tax subsidies to contain similar types of negative
externalities.18 Although success has been mixed and criticism plentiful,
this article draws from the research that when these types of subsidies are
tailored, limited, variable, and complementary, they can be successful and
impactful.
Based on these qualities, this article identifies and scrutinizes three
different conceptual legal models for smarter federal homeowner
subsidies.19 These models are: (i) creating a national map of subsidy
eligible and ineligible zones based on the relationship between homeowner
behavior in those zones and the reduction of negative housing externalities;
(ii) offering a collection of a la carte subsidies, each rewarding a specific
type of homeowner decision; and (iii) allocating subsidies on a communityby-community or project-by- project basis to support community housing
plans and public sector programs that address prescribed negative housing
externalities. It is important to emphasize that none of these models need
work to the exclusion of improving the performance of homeowner
subsidies in making homeownership more affordable. Again, the very
question this article grapples with is whether it is possible to engineer the
subsidies to simultaneously accomplish multiple housing policy objectives.
Each of these models has advantages, but presents challenges, not least
of which follows from trying to accomplish multiple objectives across
thousands of different U.S. housing markets.20 At the same time, the article
calls attention to the recent revolution in the quality, quantity, and
17
18
19
20

See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VI.B.
See infra Part VI.C.
See infra Part VI.D.
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accessibility of housing market and property specific real estate data, which
is fueling a significant uptick in the sophistication of land use planning at
the community level. Those advances may be the best reason to think that
smarter federal homeowner subsidies are attainable.
This article closes by suggesting a path forward.21 Congress should
approve a HUD-administered pilot program for targeted homeowner
subsidies using the third model, and through it foster community level
innovation to identify models that are replicable throughout the country.
Considering the significant political and practical challenges to undertaking
immediate and wholescale reform of the current homeowner subsidies, a
more gradual, less expensive, and pilot-based strategy should also make
adoption by Congress more likely. For several practical reasons, and a
potential constitutional one, a program like this probably belongs outside of
the federal tax code.
This article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a short overview of the
three principal homeowner subsidies. Part III summarizes criticism of the
subsidies as to the principal rationale for their existence—encouraging and
expanding access to homeownership. Part IV examines the subsidies
through a different lens by identifying the negative housing externalities
that other federal housing-related policies seek to combat and the complete
disconnect between the subsidies and containing or offsetting these
externalities. Part V introduces the concept of smarter subsidies and
explains why the current subsidies miss the mark. Part VI explores in depth
how smarter homeowner subsidies might be devised. It examines what
research has revealed about the effectiveness of selectively available,
demand-side subsidies at the state and local levels, how this might be
reflected in the design of federal homeowner subsidies, and the recent
advances in real estate data and analytics that may make this feasible. Part
VII closes with this article’s proposal for a path forward.
II.

TAX CODE’S PRINCIPAL HOMEOWNER SUBSIDIES

This article focuses on the three principal tax breaks that the federal
income tax code provides directly to homeowners—the mortgage interest
deduction, the property tax deduction, and the exclusion from taxable
income of capital gain on home sales. The tax code contains other subsidies
for homeowners, but none are nearly as expensive nor as broadly utilized as
these three.22 For ease of reference, this article uses the term “homeowner
subsidies” to mean just these three subsidies.
21
22

See infra Part VI.E.
See Benjamin H. Harris, C. Eugene Steuerle & Amanda Eng, New Perspectives on
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It is also worth noting that the U.S. income tax system provides
homeowners a fourth substantial tax break by not taxing the imputed net
rental income that results from them living in their own homes. Because the
notion of taxing imputed home rental income is viewed as administratively
very difficult, politically perilous, and inconsistent with how the tax code
treats other imputed rental income, this article does not include it.23
As background, below are basic overviews of the three principal
subsidies.
A.

Mortgage Interest Deduction

Generally speaking, Section 163(h)(2)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code
(the “Code”) allows homeowners to deduct the interest they pay on their
home mortgages from taxable income.24 The mortgage interest deduction
(the “MID”) is an exception to the general rule that taxpayers may not
deduct interest on personal debt (i.e. debt not attributable to a trade or
business, or investment activity).25 It is the largest of the homeowner
subsidies. Congress estimates that the MID alone will cost the federal
government $63.6 billion in forgone tax revenue in 2017.26
As with most deductions, the MID is subject to numerous statutory
clarifications. Most of these are included in the definition of “qualified
residence interest,” which provides the actual parameters on what is
deductible.27 Qualified residence interest includes interest on debt up to
$1,000,000 that is secured by a qualified residence and that is used to
acquire, construct, or substantially improve the residence (“acquisition
indebtedness”).28 It also includes interest on up to $100,000 in “home
equity indebtedness,” which is debt secured by a qualified residence and
Homeownership Tax Incentives, TAX NOTES, Dec. 23, 2013, at 1315, 1317,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/1001710-NewPerspectives-on-Homeownership-Tax-Incentives.pdf (identifying the cost of the three
principal homeowner tax incentives in 2013 as $121.3 billion as compared to $7.8 billion for
the cost of the Code’s eight other housing related tax expenditures). Examples of other tax
code homeowner subsidies include the deduction for premiums for qualified mortgage
insurance and the exclusion of income attributable to the discharge of principal residence
acquisition indebtedness.
23
See, e.g., Steve R. Johnson, Imputed Rental Income: Reality Trumps Theory, in
CONTROVERSIES IN TAX LAW: A MATTER OF PERSPECTIVE 65 (Anthony C. Infanti ed., 2015).
24
26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2017).
25
Id. § 163(h).
26
2017 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, supra note 3, at 32.
27
26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (2017).
28
Id. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii). The limitation if the taxpayer is a married individual filing a
separate return is $500,000.
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used for any other purpose.29 “Qualified residence” means the taxpayer’s
principal residence, as well as up to one additional home the taxpayer uses
as a residence (e.g. a vacation or weekend home).30
An important feature of the MID is that it is an itemized deduction.31
This imposes some very significant limitations on who can claim it. First, in
order to take any deduction, a person must have taxable income from which
to subtract the deduction.32 Many U.S. households fall below the income
thresholds for paying any federal income tax and, thus, cannot utilize the
MID.33 Second, because the Code automatically provides all taxpayers with
a standard deduction that can be taken in lieu of itemized deductions, an
itemized deduction is only worthwhile to those taxpayers whose total
itemized deductions exceed their standard deduction.34 For that reason, only
about 30% of taxpayers itemize, most of whom are in the top income
brackets.35
At the very high end of the income spectrum, the total amount of
itemized deductions a taxpayer can claim is gradually reduced pursuant to
what is commonly known as the Pease limitation.36 The likelihood of the
Pease limitation making the mortgage interest deduction entirely worthless,
however, is virtually non-existent for all but the very richest of itemizers
who would seek to claim it.37

29

Id. §163(h)(3)(C). Additional limitations apply to the definition of home equity
indebtedness. It cannot exceed the difference between the fair market value of the home
minus the acquisition indebtedness on the home. Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i). In the case of a
separate return filed by a married individual, the limitation on home equity indebtedness for
which interest is deductible is $50,000. Id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii).
30
Id. § 163(h)(4)(A).
31
See id. § 63(d).
32
See id. § 63(a).
33
Approximately 43% of the population, many of whom are lower income, did not owe
any federal income taxes for 2013. Roberton Williams, Who Doesn’t Pay Federal Taxes?,
TAX POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/resources/video-whodoesnt-pay-federal-taxes.
34
See 26 U.S.C. § 63(c) (2017).
35
SEAN LOWRY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43012, ITEMIZED TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR
INDIVIDUALS: DATA ANALYSIS 2 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43012.pdf.
36
26 U.S.C. § 68 (2017).
37
For fiscal year 2016, the Pease limitation only applied to taxpayers with an adjusted
gross income (AGI) of more than $311,300 if married filing jointly or $259,400 if single (the
“baseline”). INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE 2016, FOR INDIVIDUALS 205 (2016). Most
taxpayers affected by the Pease limitation see their itemized deductions reduced by 3% of
the difference between the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income and this baseline. See 26
U.S.C.S. § 68(a)(1) (2017).
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Property Tax Deduction

The Code also allows homeowners to deduct property taxes assessed on
their homes from taxable income. The real property tax deduction is part of
a broader deduction that the Code allows for most taxes a taxpayer must
pay to state and local governments, which this article will refer to by its
commonly known acronym “SALT” (deduction for State and Local
Taxes).38 Congress estimates that the real property tax deduction
component of SALT will cost the federal government $33.3 billion in
forgone tax revenue in 2017.39
Carved out of SALT are taxes assessed against a particular property for a
benefit understood to increase that property’s value, like the installation of a
sidewalk or an irrigation system on that property.40 But, so long as the real
property tax is levied for the general public welfare, the taxpayer may
deduct it.41
As with the mortgage interest deduction, SALT is an itemized deduction,
and thus only claimed by those who have federal taxable income and also
have enough qualifying expenses to make itemizing deductions
worthwhile.42 SALT may also be reduced for high income taxpayers by the
Pease limitation, though as with the MID, this is only even potentially an
issue for very high income households.43
SALT is potentially reducible in another way, which for the most part
does not apply to the MID.44 SALT is added back into taxable income when
a taxpayer is subject to the Code’s alternative minimum tax (“AMT”).45
The AMT is a parallel income tax system that applies an alternative tax rate
to a broader base of income of a wealthier taxpayer whose taxable income
under the normal rules has been so reduced by exemptions and deductions
that her effective tax rate has reached an unacceptable level.46 About 5% of
38

26 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2017) (identifying “state and local, and foreign, real property
taxes” as includable within the deduction).
39
2017 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, supra note 3, at 32.
40
26 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (2017); 26 C.F.R. § 1.164-4(a) (2017).
41
See 26 C.F.R. 1.164-3(b) (2017).
42
See 26 U.S.C. § 63(d) (2017).
43
See Williams, supra note 33.
44
The alternative minimum tax does not apply to amounts deducted as acquisition
indebtedness, which is the more substantial component of the MID. See 26 U.S.C. § 56(e)
(2017). Interest on home equity indebtedness is, however, added back in to taxable income
when calculating the AMT.
45
Id. § 55.
46
NORTON FRANCIS ET AL., TAX POL’Y CTR. BRIEFING BOOK (Peter Passell et al. eds.,
2016), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-does-deduction-state-and-localtaxes-work. (ebook).
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taxpayers are subject to the AMT,47 and it is good bet that many of them see
the value of their SALT deduction reduced.48 Nevertheless, this is far less
than the total percentage of taxpayers claiming SALT, which is virtually all
itemizers.49
C.

Exclusion of Capital Gain on Home Sales

Section 121 of the Code also allows homeowners to exclude from federal
income tax up to $250,000 (or $500,000 if married and filing jointly) of the
gain they realize when selling their principal residences.50 Forgoing tax on
this income will cost the federal government an estimated $32.1 billion in
2017. 51
Certain qualifications apply, of course. A taxpayer can use this exclusion
no more than once every two years.52 Also, generally speaking, the taxpayer
must have owned and used the home in question as her principal residence
for at least two of the five years prior to sale; there are, however, several
statutory permutations of this requirement to address circumstances like
subsequent marriages, spouses residing in separate homes, time spent in
uniformed services, etc.53
As an exclusion from income rather than a deduction, Section 121
applies more broadly than a deduction. Most home sellers benefit from it.
This is because the gain, subject to the monetary limits identified above, is
not calculated as part of taxable income in the first place, and therefore is
not subject to the limitations imposed on itemized deductions. For the same
reason, it is not subject to offset by the Pease limitation or the AMT.

47

T17-0149—Characteristics of Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) Payers, 2016 – 2018
and 2027, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/modelestimates/baseline-alternative-minimum-tax-amt-tables-april-2017/t17-0149-characteristics.
48
FRANCIS, ET AL., supra note 46.
49
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF STATE AND LOCAL TAXES 2
(2008).
50
26 U.S.C. § 121 (2017).
51
2017 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, supra note 3, at 32. It is worth a reminder here that
the tax revenue gained from eliminating Section 121, in particular, would fall short of the tax
revenue currently forgone. It is reasonable to expect that fewer home sales would occur
without the home sale capital gain exclusion. See id.
52
26 U.S.C. § 121(b)(3) (2017).
53
Id. § 121.
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RELATIONSHIP OF SUBSIDIES TO ENCOURAGING AND EXPANDING
ACCESS TO HOMEOWNERSHIP

Judging by their origins, the homeowner subsidies are a motley crew.
The mortgage interest deduction originates from a provision in the nation’s
original income tax code that at one time made interest on all personal debt
deductible.54 The property tax deduction is part of the broader deduction for
most state and local taxes, which is available to homeowners and nonhomeowners alike and is arguably separately justified as shielding
taxpayers from the apparent inequity of paying income tax on dollars they
must pay in taxes.55 Even the exclusion of home sale capital gains did not
originate from a global effort to promote homeownership. Rather, it came
about piecemeal, through gradual accretion to the notion that gains realized
on the sale of one’s home can bring about large, untimely, and
administratively challenging tax burdens, and that trying to relieve this tax
only in certain circumstances causes distortions in the behavior of other
homeowners and creates inequities.56
Origins notwithstanding, all three subsidies are now commonly justified
as encouraging homeownership. The mortgage interest deduction survived
the 1986 overhaul of the Code, when Congress repealed the rest of the
personal debt interest deduction, because proponents spun it as essential to
preserving the American Dream of homeownership.57 SALT has been the
object of multiple unsuccessful repeal efforts, and in each case Congress
has considered carving out the property tax deduction component, in
recognition of its link to homeownership.58 And the periodic expansions of
the home sale capital gains exclusion clearly would not have been possible
without the understanding that homeownership, as a form of saving and
investment, was something Congress sought to promote. Year after year,

54

This deduction may have resulted from Congress wishing to save taxpayers from what
was then perceived as the difficult task of distinguishing between personal and profitseeking debt. See generally Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and
Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (2010).
55
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 410 (Foundation, 7th ed. 2013).
56
See generally Lily Kahng, Path Dependence in Tax Subsidies for Home Sales, 65
ALA. L. REV. 187 (2013).
57
See Ventry, Jr., supra note 54.
58
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2116. See also, Aaron
Lorenzo & Rachel Bade, First GOP Tax Reform Feud Erupts Over State, Local Tax Break,
POLITICO (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/28/gop-tax-reform-feudstate-local-tax-break-243285.
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Congress reports all three subsidies as housing expenditures, making no
secret of what it believes they are meant to do.59
There is some irony then in the significant doubt cast on the link between
the homeowner subsidies and encouraging or expanding access to
homeownership. The MID, perhaps because it is the largest of the subsidies,
has received the greatest scrutiny. Most strikingly, several policy experts
have proclaimed that the MID has had no discernible effect on the
homeownership rate.60 Viewed over a half century, the American
homeownership rate has remained relatively constant, even though the
value of the MID has fluctuated significantly at times, indicating that an
increased level of MID subsidy doesn’t cause a greater percentage of
Americans to become homeowners.61
This is not to say that the MID has no impact on home-buying decisions.
In fact, numerous studies have shown that the MID does increase the
amount Americans spend on housing.62 But its primary impact is on highincome households who increase their housing consumption by buying
larger and more expensive homes than they might have otherwise.63 These
are households that would likely already buy homes and thus don’t need
subsidies to encourage them to do so.64 Low and middle income
households, which are those likely to be on the fence between renting and
buying a home, are by comparison largely unaffected by the MID.65
59

See 2017 TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGET, supra note 3.
See, e.g., Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 3; Christian A. L. Hilber & Tracy M.
Turner, The Mortgage Interest Deduction and Its Impact on Homeownership Decisions, 96
REV. ECON. & STAT. 618 (2013); Jonathan Gruber, Amalie Jensen & Henrik Kleven, Do
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Denmark (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 23600, 2017).
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Glaeser & Shapiro, supra note 6.
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See Andrew Hanson, Size of Home, Homeownership and Mortgage Interest
Deduction, 21 J. HOUS. ECON. 195 (2012); Jeremy Horpedahl & Harrison Searles, The Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction, MERCATUS CTR.: MERCATUS ON POL’Y SERIES (Jan. 8, 2013),
https://www.mercatus.org/publication/home-mortgage-interest-deduction; Dean Stansel &
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(Dec.
18,
2013)),
Much?
2013
Update,
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http://reason.org/news/show/mortgage-interest-deduction-benefit.
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Hanson, supra note 62; Horpedahl & Searles, supra note 62; Jeremy Horpedahl &
Harrison Searles, The Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, MERCATUS CENT.: MERCATUS ON
POL’Y SERIES (Jan. 8, 2013), https://www.mercatus.org/publication/home-mortgage-interestdeduction; Andrew Hanson, Size of Home, Homeownership and Mortgage Interest
Deduction, 21 J. OF HOUS. ECON. 195 (2012).
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The explanation for why the MID produces these results is no great
mystery and has received considerable attention. The MID is a classic
example of an upside-down subsidy. As discussed in Part II, the only
homeowners who can take advantage of the MID are those who have
taxable liability to offset and have sufficient qualifying expenses (mortgage
interest, income taxes, charitable contributions, etc.) to make itemizing
deductions worthwhile, as opposed to taking the standard deduction.66
These requirements alone make nearly all of the lower two income quintiles
of American households ineligible for the MID and leaves only roughly
30% of taxpayers, primarily those in the upper two income quintiles, as
potential claimants.67
Furthermore, even among claimants, tax-code deductions are
significantly more valuable to higher-income taxpayers than they are to
middle and lower income taxpayers. This is partly due to the fact that a
taxpayer’s income is not taxed at a uniform rate, but rather at a series of
escalating marginal rates that increase as a taxpayer’s income increases.68
The value of a deduction depends on the rate at which the deducted income
would have been taxed. To illustrate, a married couple (filing jointly) with
$280,000 in taxable income and $10,000 in deductible mortgage interest
reduces their taxable income to $270,000, which is income taxed at 33%.69
Accordingly, they receive a tax reduction of $3,300. An otherwise identical
couple with $70,000 in taxable income also deducts $10,000, but gets a tax
reduction of only $1,500 because this income is in the 15% tax bracket.70
Add to this that higher income households own more expensive homes and
so usually have larger mortgages and more mortgage interest to deduct, and
it is little wonder that the lion’s share of the benefits from the MID go to
high income households.71
Although it has received less isolated scrutiny than the MID, the property
tax component of SALT has similar consequences.72 This is because SALT
66

Williams, supra note 33. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GUIDE 2016 FOR
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POL’Y
CTR.
9
(July
21,
2009),
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See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 55, at 23-24.
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TAX CTR. (last visited July 24, 2017), https://www.irs.com/articles/2016-federal-tax-ratespersonal-exemptions-and-standard-deductions.
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See id.
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Toder, Harris & Lim, supra note 67.
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Id. See also, Harris, Steuerle & Eng, supra note 22, at 1319.

216

University of Hawai‘i Law Review / Vol. 40:1

is nearly identical in design to the MID and likewise an upside-down
subsidy. Unsurprisingly, its benefits also inure disproportionately to those
who have higher income and it is much less valuable to homeowners who
have less income.73
The exclusion of home sale capital gains is a different animal than the
deductions. But the benefits of this subsidy also flow primarily to higher
income individuals. First, households in the 15% tax bracket and below pay
no capital gains tax and, thus, receive no benefit from this subsidy.74 For
those not automatically exempt from this tax, marginal tax brackets play
less of a role than with MID and SALT, since most taxpayers pay tax on
capital gains at a rate of 15%.75 However, those with very high incomes
would pay capital gains tax at a 20% rate and so the break is larger at the
high end of the income scale.76 Furthermore, wealthier taxpayers tend to
own more expensive homes, which, all other factors equal, generate larger
gain.77 Finally, wealthier homeowners tend to live in more exclusive and
wealthier neighborhoods, where home values appreciate at greater rates and
so, again, receive larger amounts of tax-free gain upon re-sale.78
Not only are the homeowner subsidies by design primarily beneficial to
upper income households, they actually tend to inflate home prices,
particularly in areas where housing supply is limited, and thus,
paradoxically, often reduce home affordability. Several economists have
studied whether the MID, in particular, reduces the cost of homeownership
for prospective home buyers or is anticipated by the housing market and
simply absorbed (“capitalized”) into higher home prices.79 The answer
73
Harris, Steuerle & Eng, supra note 22, at 1319, 1328 (referencing the UrbanBrookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model at Table 1). See Toder, Harris, & Lim,
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https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409.html (last updated Sept. 21, 2017).
75
Id. Topic Number: 409 - Capital Gains and Losses, IRS: TAX TOPICS,
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409.html (last updated Sept. 21, 2017).
76
Id. Generally speaking, for 2016 returns, the 20% rate applies to single taxpayers with
taxable income $415,050 or greater, and married taxpayers filing jointly with taxable income
$466,950 or greater. Id.
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See Harris, Steuerle, & Eng, supra note 22, at 1319.
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See, e.g., David Albouy & Mike Zabek, Housing Inequality, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 21916, 2016). See also Jim Tankersley & Ted Mellnik,
Exclusive Neighborhoods, Exclusive Recovery, WASH. POST (May 4, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/business/wonk/housing/charlotte/.
79
See Hilber & Turner, supra note 60. See also DENNIS R. Capozza, Richard K. Green,
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appears to be that it depends. Where the supply of housing is limited, due to
a combination of regulations that hamper construction and geographic
factors, and housing demand is high, home prices fully capitalize the
subsidy.80 So the subsidy does not act to lower homeownership costs and
instead increases the bar for lower income, down payment constrained
households entering the market in those places where they most need a
subsidy.81
In markets with lax land use regulations, fewer geographic barriers,
and/or lower demand, the MID is not fully capitalized and does reduce
homeownership costs.82 But, as explained above, even in these areas the
MID inures primarily to the benefit of high income households who would
likely already purchase a home and, therefore, does not really improve
homeownership attainment.83
In sum, as it relates to increasing homeownership opportunities, the track
record of the homeowner subsidies is abysmal. It is more accurate to say
that the subsidies reward the homeownership investments of certain
homeowners, most of whom need no incentive to become homeowners,
than to say that the subsidies encourage or expand access to
homeownership.
IV.

RELATIONSHIP OF SUBSIDIES TO NEGATIVE HOUSING
EXTERNALITIES AND RELATED POLICIES

The homeowner subsidies are problematic in another way that has drawn
significantly less attention. Decisions as to where and in what type of home
a household lives have consequences not only for that household, but the
surrounding community and society at large. The benefits to and costs on
others that result from homeowner decisions can be thought of as a category
of “housing externalities.” To some degree and at considerable expense, the
federal government intervenes through policies it adopts to contain or offset
negative housing externalities, especially those that impose significant or
concentrated costs on others.
As this Part will demonstrate, the homeowner subsidies, at best, provide
very little support to these other housing related policies. At worst, they
actually exacerbate the negative externalities that the policies try to contain
and, in this sense, undermine these policies. Moreover, in the absence of a
Effects on Bounded and Unbounded Communities (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Working Paper
No. 98-23, 1998).
80
See Hilber & Turner, supra note 60.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
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demand-side supplement capable of meaningfully encouraging homeowner
behavior that reduces negative housing externalities, the policies
themselves are not very effective. This Part identifies several categories of
negative housing externalities, the conditions that give rise to them, the
federal policies that seek to contain them and their relationship (or, in
actuality, the lack thereof) with the current homeowner subsidies.
A.

Ameliorating Blight, Deterioration, and Public Health Threats in
Disinvested Communities
1.

Background

Communities throughout the country grapple with the collateral damage
that results from chronic disinvestment.84 Community disinvestment is a
process by which residents, businesses, and other financially mobile
economic actors extricate themselves from a community they perceive as
deteriorating and too risky in which to invest capital, leading to further
decline and, in some cases, large-scale abandonment.85
Illustrative of this phenomenon is the now familiar story of Midwestern
and Northeastern “legacy” cities.86 These are places where industry and
manufacturing once flourished and supported thriving residential
communities.87 Persistent adverse economic forces subsequently turned the
tide in these cities, causing the loss of many large employers and good
paying jobs, lowering the overall standard of living, and stemming
population growth.88 As their economic fortunes turned for the worse, other
forms of capital also fled. Highways, readily available mortgages, and a
quest for greener, roomier, and more homogenous communities catalyzed
the flight of more affluent residents, often times to newly-created suburbs
just beyond the boundaries of legacy cities.89 As more financially mobile
residents left and new ones have looked elsewhere, stores have shuttered,
community institutions like hospitals and schools have closed or
consolidated, and banks have stopped lending.90 Compounded over time,
these decisions can dramatically shrink a legacy city’s income base and
84
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decrease its property values, meaning local government receives less tax
revenue and struggles to provide basic services. At the same time,
sustaining an economically needier community and aging infrastructure
increases the demands on government.
Left unchecked, disinvestment can cause a full-fledged, downward
community spiral, spurring the remaining mobile capital to leave,
overwhelming local resources and accelerating physical deterioration.
Those residents who cannot afford to leave are left behind. More recently,
older suburbs closest to the urban cores of legacy cities are encountering the
next wave of disinvestment as developers and economically mobile
homebuyers push out one ring farther to brand new suburbs and exurbs, or
selectively re-populate more trendy sections of urban cores.91
This pattern of historically short periods of community settlement,
expansion and abandonment in legacy cities is only one narrative (albeit a
common one) of community disinvestment in the United States. A bird’s
eye view of the country reveals the wide-spread prevalence of disinvesting
and disinvested communities, often within close proximity of communities
that are prospering.92 By one measurement, 22.1% of U.S. census tracts
have significantly depressed property values and predominantly low income
populations, which are hallmarks of community disinvestment.93 So-called
“middle neighborhoods” constitute another large category of communities
that are less distressed at this point, but sit on the precipice of disinvestment
due to their increasingly poorer and older populations, and aging housing
stock.94
The physical condition of housing stock is a particularly visible and
jarring manifestation of the consequences and costs of community
disinvestment. Disinvested communities must manage increasing stockpiles
91

ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & ALAN BERUBE, CONFRONTING SUBURBAN POVERTY IN
AMERICA 5-9 (2014).
92
See, e.g., Heat Maps, TRULIA, https://www.trulia.com/home_prices/ (last visited July
28, 2017); see also Albouy & Zabek, supra note 78; Martin Burch et al., Housing Prices Still
Falling for Working-Class Families, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2015), http://perma.cc/NM6RB6KC; Albouy & Zabek, supra note 78; The 2016 Distressed Communities Index, ECON.
INNOVATION
GROUP,
http://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2016-DistressedCommunities-Index-Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
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Neighborhood Homes Investment Act Coalition, Neighborhood Homes Tax Credit
Presentation,
Ohio
Presentation
(July
20-21,
2017),
https://www.dropbox.com/s/048w8v0mygpihmt/NHTC_Ohio_presentation_FINAL.pdf?dl=
0.
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See generally Ira Goldstein et al., Demographics and Characteristics of Middle
Neighborhoods in Select Legacy Cities, in ON THE EDGE: AMERICA’S MIDDLE
NEIGHBORHOODS ch. 3 (Paul Brophy ed., 2016) (indicating that between 37 and 51% of
residents in sample legacy cities, like Baltimore, Detroit, Milwaukee and Philadelphia, live
in middle neighborhoods).
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of outdated, orphaned, devalued, and deteriorating homes. Direct costs
associated with these properties include increased code enforcement,
boarding, property maintenance (grass and trash), fire and police runs, and,
ultimately, when they have reached an advanced stage of decay,
demolitions.95 Meanwhile, local government loses property tax revenue
necessary to cover the direct costs as these properties deteriorate and lose
value, the owners stop paying the taxes altogether, and/or the structures on
them are demolished.96 Then, there is the negative spillover effect that
vacant and deteriorating homes have on the values of surrounding homes,
which not only further reduces property tax revenue for the city, but also
depletes the wealth of neighbors, sometimes dramatically.97
At work is severe market failure. Disinvestment decisions drive down
property values to the point that they can no longer support private
investment. Remaining homeowners hesitate to make improvements to their
homes out of a concern they will not recoup these investments.98
Developers, lenders, and prospective home buyers view rehabbing viable
homes or demolishing and replacing those that are blighted as cost
prohibitive or too risky, and so new capital also dries up.99
The costs of supporting flailing housing markets typically prove too
much for local actors to bear alone, and the federal government steps in. In
1965, Congress created a cabinet level agency, the U.S. Department of
95
CMTY. RESEARCH PARTNERS & REBUILD OHIO, $60 MILLION AND COUNTING: THE
COST OF VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES TO EIGHT OHIO CITIES v (2008),
https://www.issuelab.org/resources/3351/3351.pdf?download=true.
96
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the annual costs of vacant and abandoned properties to those cities at $64 million—nearly
$15 million in city service costs and over $49 million from lost tax revenues from
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97
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(2015) (estimating “conservatively” the costs of vacant and blighted properties in Atlanta to
city government at between $2.6 million and $5.7 million annually along with a one-time
cost to single family property values of $153 million).
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Housing and Urban Development (HUD), largely as a response to
disinvestment in U.S. cities and a heightening concern for those left to live
in them.100 While HUD has overseen an alphabet soup of different
programs over a half century, its longest standing and primary program for
addressing disinvestment is the Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) program.101 Through CDBG, HUD annually transfers billions of
federal dollars to cities, urban counties, and states, much of which goes to
trying to stabilize and revitalize their disinvested housing markets.102
Eligible expenses include strategic property acquisition, housing
construction and rehabilitation, housing code enforcement, and community
planning.103
Ultimately, however, the amount of assistance HUD provides is small
compared to the scope of the problem.104 Furthermore, CDBG rules
effectively restrict funding to areas with high poverty and, thus, already
highly distressed housing markets; in so doing, these rules exclude
communities that are starting to deteriorate, but where intervention could
enable a turnaround.105 This is emblematic of the crisis-management
mentality the federal government takes to disinvestment. This mentality
was further exemplified by the Congressional response to communities hit
hardest during the country’s recent foreclosure crisis, a disinvestment event
of mammoth proportions. Congress approved over $7 billion in
Neighborhood Stabilization Program funds, administered through CDBG,
over a five year period to try and stop the most severe bleeding in housing
markets afflicted by concentrated numbers of foreclosures and vacancies.106
But it refused to extend the program beyond this point, even though few of

100
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the communities funded had begun to show signs of a meaningful
turnaround.107
To this point, this section has focused on the housing market dysfunction
that follows from community disinvestment, while ignoring the associated
human costs. These are in fact quite staggering. Older communities with
large numbers of distressed and vacant residential properties have
remarkably higher incidences of public health issues, like lead paint
poisoning among children,108 asthma,109 chronic health conditions,110 and
other environmental hazards.111 They also correlate strongly with higher
incidences of violent crime.112 Local governments rely on a stable
residential tax base to fund critical infrastructure like school systems, water
line maintenance, sewage and storm water systems, road repair, and public
transit. When tax revenue shrinks, all of these suffer.113
The federal government routinely directs billions of dollars annually to
communities struggling to meet these types of costs through a wide array of
programs.114 Again, it is also the ultimate backstop when a crisis that traces
107
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back to disinvestment arises. As simply one example, cost-cutting to meet
municipal general fund shortfalls, recently resulted in contamination of the
water supply of Flint, Michigan, long viewed as a poster child for urban
disinvestment. With the city teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, Congress
stepped in with $120 million to help replace lead water supply lines in all of
Flint’s homes and to make an initial down payment on the long-term health
issues expected from the widespread lead poisoning of the city’s residents
that occurred.115
This is to say nothing of the considerable dollars Congress has spent or
forgone in attempts to revitalize disinvested communities through economic
development. These initiatives have varied from decade to decade and
included Empowerment Zones, Enterprise and Renewal Communities, and
New Market Tax Credits.116 For the most part, they have sought to leverage
federal grants and tax breaks to attract private capital to invest in businesses
in distressed neighborhoods in order to put local residents to work and
spark community reinvestment.117
2.

Relationship to Homeowner Subsidies

As some of the federal interventions described above suggest, what
disinvestment has wrought, the reinvestment of private dollars could help
remedy. An influx of new homeowners would reduce stockpiles of vacant
structures, invest capital in rehabilitated or new homes, increase tax
revenue, and, by extension, offset negative housing externalities associated
with disinvestment.118 This has proven to be the case in communities
throughout the country where disinvestment wrecked less damage and some
combination of market dynamics and forward looking policies created the
right mix of circumstances for reinvestment to occur.119 It is also the
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philosophy Congress has adhered to in creating federal tax breaks for
businesses to locate in disinvested communities.
And yet the homeowner subsidies are, at least on their face, entirely
neutral in this regard. They reward an investment in homeownership
equally no matter where it occurs, whether it is in a thriving residential
market or one that is highly disinvested. The result is that although the
federal government absorbs significant costs in containing damage to and
ostensibly laying the foundation for housing market recoveries in
disinvested communities, its primary mechanisms for encouraging
households to invest in homes do nothing to encourage prospective
homebuyers to purchase there.
Furthermore, although facially neutral, the reality is that the subsidies to
a large extent support homeowners who live in affluent, non-disinvested
communities. Numerous studies have demonstrated that the geographic
distribution of the subsidies is strongly tilted towards areas where housing
prices, income levels, and homeownership rates are high120—the hallmarks
of a healthy housing market. This is unsurprising considering the design of
the subsidies. Home sale gains are more likely to occur (and in greater
amounts) in robust housing markets, and, therefore, the savings yielded by
excluding them from capital gains tax will also be greater.121 Also, home
prices are higher in stronger housing markets. Those with the most
expensive homes not only are likely to have larger mortgages and higher
property taxes, but also sit in higher marginal tax brackets and, therefore,
receive a greater tax benefit for each dollar of mortgage interest and
property tax they deduct.
Conversely, homeowners in disinvested communities will, generally
speaking, have lower mortgage interest and property tax costs (due to the
lower values of their homes), sit in lower marginal tax brackets, and yield
smaller gains upon selling their homes, and, thus, yield less benefit from the
homeowner subsidies. An exception to this rule exists for those who own
more expensive homes in disinvested communities that have higher local
property tax rates due to greater municipal costs. In this way, the property
tax deduction may alleviate a barrier to homeownership in disinvested
communities. But this subsidy is not designed to achieve this end and so its
120
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impact on housing markets in disinvested communities is largely incidental
and much less than it could be. The reality is that homes are typically worth
less in disinvested communities and fewer residents are affluent enough to
itemize their deductions, making the property tax deduction relatively much
less valuable for homeowners in these communities than in more affluent
communities.
The bottom line is that the homeowner subsidies do relatively little to
encourage homeowners to invest in disinvested communities. While this
again is unsurprising based on how deductions and exclusions operate, it
seems difficult to justify a system in which the vast majority of the
homeowner subsidies incentivize home purchases in housing markets that
function well and in which the private market already rewards homeowners
for their purchases, while doing little for struggling markets that present
large disincentives to purchase and impose significant costs on the public
sector. This is especially true given that, as Part III demonstrated, the
subsidies do not even help lower-income households access thriving
markets and, in fact, probably operate to exclude them.
To go one step further, the homeowner subsidies probably counteract the
federal government’s policy of containing the damage in disinvested
communities by incentivizing higher income taxpayers to leave or stay
away. This is because the principal impact of the subsidies is to cause these
types of taxpayers to over-invest in housing by buying larger, more
expensive homes and in higher income areas than they might otherwise so
that they can maximize their tax benefits under the subsidies.122 Especially
when coupled with exclusionary land use restrictions (like large minimum
lot size requirements) imposed in many high-end developments, the
subsidies contribute to a form of income-level sorting, attracting more
affluent prospective homeowners to higher income areas. This squeezes out
low income entrants and contributes to capital flight and home price losses
in declining housing markets.123
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Decreasing Economic and Racial Segregation
1.

Background

Housing in the United States is highly segregated by wealth and race.
Economic segregation, in particular, is increasing dramatically. The
percentage of poor households living in high poverty neighborhoods has
grown from 43% to 54% in just the last 15 years; meanwhile, the
percentage of high income households living in high income neighborhoods
has also escalated (from 40% to 49% in the last 25 years).124 These statistics
are consistent with recent studies revealing that high income households are
choosing with greater frequency to pay more to live in exclusive
communities, and with the decrease in the size of the middle class.125 This
increasing stratification is facilitated by land use restrictions imposed by
local ordinances and property developers and market-driven forces that
drive up the cost of housing in affluent communities to the point where it
effectively bars low income residents.
Racial segregation in housing is actually declining gradually, but remains
quite high. A Brookings Institution study based on 2010-2014 census data
showed that all fifty-two of the nation’s largest metropolitan areas are
significantly segregated by race.126 This is especially true as it relates to
black-white segregation. According to one common measurement of
housing segregation, more than half of all blacks would have to move from
their current communities to white communities for those communities to
match the national ratio of white to black residents.127 Racial segregation is
the legacy of a legal system that for much of the country’s history permitted
discrimination in housing practices and a culture that has long stigmatized
differences in race.128 Race-based neighborhood stereotyping continues to
124
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be a common practice and an explanation for why many white homebuyers
choose to avoid or leave neighborhoods with large or growing AfricanAmerican populations.129
Because poverty rates are much higher among African Americans and
Hispanics than among whites, it is difficult to separate a discussion of
economic and race segregation.130 Low income neighborhoods in the
United States have disproportionately high minority populations.131 In fact,
not only poor African-Americans but all African-Americans are much more
likely to live in high poverty neighborhoods than their white
counterparts.132 Perhaps most troubling, 66% of young African-Americans
live in poor neighborhoods (10 times as many as young whites).133
Housing segregation imposes severe costs on those who live in high
poverty communities.134 To a large extent, these communities overlap with
the disinvested communities discussed in Part IV.A and, thus, face many of
the same problems. These include smaller tax bases and less private
investment, resulting in poorer quality housing, institutions, infrastructure,
and services for their residents.135 High poverty communities also fare
much worse in terms of safety, environmental quality, and health.136 Part
IV.A details these negative housing externalities and federal attempts to
mitigate them.
Particularly germane to residential segregation and worth separate
mention here is the opportunity gap, or a lack of access to pathways out of
poverty, for those isolated in high poverty communities. These pathways
include well-performing schools, positive role models, access to job
129
See Ingrid Gould Ellen, Continuing Isolation: Segregation in America Today, in
SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 270 (James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty
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opportunities, and examples of success.137 Instead of these pathways,
residents of communities with concentrated poverty must contend daily
with unsafe streets, substandard housing conditions, and dysfunctional
behavior.138 Of foremost concern is the individual personal harm that
follows. However, it is also important to recognize the resulting societal
costs that compound over time. These include an increased reliance on
entitlement programs, and high incarceration rates among residents in these
communities, which imposes costs on all taxpayers.139 On a macro level,
high levels of residential isolation inhibit local labor markets, stunting a
metropolitan area’s economic growth and harming both marginalized and
non-marginalized residents.140 Spread across multiple metropolitan areas, it
impairs the country’s ability to compete in a global economy, running
counter to national interests.141
As mentioned previously, explaining the costs of racial segregation,
separate from economic segregation, is more challenging. And yet solid
evidence exists. For instance, it has long been established that home prices
and appreciation in predominantly African-American communities lag
considerably behind homes in predominantly white communities with
comparable resident income levels.142 This disparity rises with increasing
levels of segregation.143 Lower home appreciation impairs wealth
accumulation among African Americans, and the significance of this is
magnified because the home is more likely to be the primary financial asset
of an African American household.144 The ripple effect of lower property
values also manifests in less local tax revenue which negatively impacts
school funding, educational achievement, and the delivery of public
services in these communities, which in turn contributes to negative racial
stereotypes and social polarization. A recent analysis of metropolitan
137
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regions across the country demonstrated that a high level of racial
segregation causes a much lower per capita income for African Americans
and projected the cost to the Chicago region alone at an estimated $4.4
billion in annual regional income and more than $8 billion in annual gross
domestic product.145
All of this said, federal policy on housing segregation has a complicated
history. Racial discrimination was at one point the law of the land. Through
at least the mid-twentieth century, federal agencies adhered to explicitly
segregationist practices that have left an enduring mark on contemporary
housing patterns.146 These included, perhaps most notoriously, the Federal
Housing Administration’s mortgage underwriting standards, which
prevented African American homeowners from getting mortgages to live in
white communities, and vice versa, and the Public Works Administration’s
construction of racially designated public housing projects in
neighborhoods with matching racial compositions.147 These expressly
discriminatory policies are fortunately now a relic of the past. Yet, federal
agencies to this day face criticism that they do not do enough to address less
overt forms of socioeconomic and racial discrimination in housing
programs they design.148
The passage of the Fair Housing Act by Congress in 1968149 was a
monumental turning point, at least as it relates to express racial
discrimination. The Act prohibited discrimination in any housing
transaction based on race150 and charged the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) with enforcing the
Act.151 Of course, prohibiting discrimination and decreasing segregation are
two different matters. The Act also obligated the HUD Secretary (in
addition to all federal executive agencies and programs related to housing
and urban development) to implement programs not just to prevent
145
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discrimination against protected classes, but also to “affirmatively []
further” fair housing.152 This mandate has proven more elusive. Its
meaning, as well as how vigorously HUD has pursued it, has varied in the
years since the Act’s enactment, based in part on who has occupied the
White House and Congress at the time and the level of opposition mounted
by private interests regulated by it.153
Nevertheless, HUD has by and large embraced the mantle of fostering
more economically and racially inclusive communities as a fundamental
part of its mission, especially in recent decades. This goal consistently
appears as a critical plank in HUD’s mission statements and strategic
plans.154 Moreover, HUD and Congress have adopted some significant
programs aimed squarely at encouraging residential integration. Perhaps the
longest standing pro-integrationist program is the Section 8 rental housing
voucher program which, at least in theory, enables low income voucher
recipients to move outside their current neighborhoods to find housing.155 In
1992, Congress authorized the HOPE VI program, a multi-billion dollar,
two decade long initiative intended to deconcentrate poverty in public
housing projects by demolishing and replacing many of them with mixed
income developments.156 Perhaps the most dramatic strides towards
decreasing residential segregation were made during the Obama
administration. During this time, HUD enlivened the long-standing
obligation that all recipients of HUD funding (which includes many state
and municipal governments) regularly assess the state of fair housing within
their jurisdictions and report to HUD on their efforts and plans to further it
as a condition of continued funding.157 The Obama administration also
introduced a new approach to rental formulas for the Section 8 program
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aimed at increasing options for voucher holders in more affluent
neighborhoods.158
2.

Relationship to Homeowner Subsidies

Homeowner subsidies would seem to be a potentially powerful
mechanism for alleviating housing segregation. To the extent that
traditional biases or development financing concerns stand in the way of
affluent and racially homogenous communities accommodating mixed
income housing, the carrot of homeowner subsidies could serve as
meaningful leverage for these communities to decide to become more
inclusive. Subsidies might also serve as tempting incentives to draw more
affluent homeowners to less affluent communities, or to attract homeowners
to a racially homogenous community that would improve its diversity.
Poorer and racially marginalized communities would, in turn, presumably
stand to benefit from increased tax bases, improved public services, and an
overall reduction of the other negative housing externalities that follow
from concentrated economic and racial isolation.
As designed, however, the current homeowner subsidies do very little to
support residential integration. Not only are they facially neutral as to
where a homeowner purchases, but also as to a prospective homeowner’s
race, ethnicity, and, at least in theory, income level. Thus, the subsidies do
not explicitly reward or penalize a homeownership decision that promotes
integration or enhances segregation.
Once again, however, the subsidies are also not actually all that neutral in
terms of their impact. Because by design they inure primarily to the benefit
of high income homeowners, who are typically found in affluent
communities with high home prices, they by and large supplement spending
on homeownership in communities that are inaccessible to lower income
households (and by extension to the strong majority of minority households
as well). Conversely, they are not of much value to those lower income
(and oftentimes minority) households who wish to move from opportunity
poor to opportunity rich communities.159

158
See Press Release, Brian Sullivan, HUD Announces New Approach to Expand Choice
and Opportunity for Section 8 Voucher Holders in Certain Hous. Markets, U.S. Dept. of
Hous.
&
Urban
Dev.
(Nov.
15,
2016),
https://www.hud.gov/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2016/HUDNo_16-173
(announcing Small Area Fair Market Rent approach). The Trump Administration has since
suspended this approach for the next two years.
159
See, e.g., Fiscal Federal Initiative, supra note 120; Gyourko & Sinai, supra note 120,
at 9.

232

University of Hawai‘i Law Review / Vol. 40:1

Stacked on top of this reality is the recognition that the subsidies
encourage the type of income sorting discussed in Part IV.A, by which
affluent homebuyers seek to live in higher yield, higher cost communities to
maximize their tax benefits from the subsidies.160 Accordingly, the
subsidies probably serve to increase economic segregation. The one
exception, as described in Part IV.A.2, is the property tax deduction, which
helps alleviate a barrier to living in communities that have higher taxes due
to the greater public expenses that follow from serving lower income
populations in poorer cities. However, any positive benefit that follows
from this deduction is largely incidental and not a reflection of its design.161
The homeowner subsidies probably heighten racial segregation for the
same reasons they heighten economic segregation and another more race
specific reason as well. As noted earlier, homes in majority African
American neighborhoods do not appreciate as much as homes in
predominantly white neighborhoods.162 White prospective home buyers
recognize this and factor it into their choice of neighborhood.163 From this,
it is not difficult to extrapolate that many white prospective homeowners
view predominantly African American neighborhoods or neighborhoods
with growing black populations as bad places to maximize their homeowner
subsidies and avoid them.
C.

Lessening Environmental Degradation Resulting from Housing
Choices, While Reducing Vulnerability of Those Who Reside in
Environmental Hotspots
1.

Background

A homeowner’s decisions as to where to live and in what type of home
affect his or her relationship to the natural environment in a wide and
complex variety of ways. One example is a home’s carbon footprint.
Homes are a major source of carbon dioxide (and other greenhouse gas)
emissions, and greenhouse gas emissions are the principal cause of global
warming.164 A home built with energy efficient materials that is smaller,
160
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uses renewable energy, and requires less driving to get to and from a job
center has a smaller carbon footprint. This type of home harms the
environment less, all other things being equal, than one that does not use
these materials, is larger, burns fossil fuels, and is further away. Some other
examples of environmental conditions impacted by housing choices include
wetlands protection, habitat and wildlife preservation, fresh and
groundwater supply, and storm and sewer water management.165
Not only does housing impact the environment, the environment impacts
housing. Homes built along coasts and in floodplains are more susceptible
to damage by severe weather events and rising tides.166 Likewise, homes
near fault lines, mountains, and forests are more susceptible to damage
from earthquakes, landslides, and forest fires, respectively.
Furthermore, housing can impact the environment in ways that in turn
increase the vulnerability of that housing. Houston’s recent encounter with
Hurricane Harvey is a telling example. Long recognized as the epitome of
booming development catalyzed by a lack of land use regulation, housing
developers in Houston have constructed one low-density, concrete laden
subdivision after another on top of former prairie.167 At the same time,
Houston sits close to the Gulf of Mexico exposing it to severe storms,
which appear to be occurring with greater frequency in vulnerable regions
due to climate change and rising sea levels.168 By replacing 65 square miles
of freshwater wetlands with impervious surfaces on which water can
accumulate, Houston’s housing development patterns have made it much
more vulnerable to massive flooding.169 This has occurred three times in
just the last three years, most recently and tragically with Hurricane
UNITED STATES 3 (3rd ed. 2015) (citing to U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
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Harvey, which caused flooding that led to a loss of lives, inundated entire
neighborhoods and damaged an estimated 200,000 homes.170
The negative externalities flowing from human behavior that degrades
the environment, including housing choices, are wide-ranging and
potentially severe. For example, if greenhouse gas emissions do not slow,
global warming is expected to raise temperatures worldwide between 2 and
11.5 degrees Fahrenheit during the 21st century.171 Such an increase is
projected to raise sea levels, fully or partially submerge certain coastal
cities, kill off 30% of the world species, increase human disease, decrease
agricultural productivity, and lead to a dramatic increase in severe weather
events and a significant impairment of the world population’s overall
quality of life.172 Accurately pegging the costs imposed by global warming
is a difficult task because it is forward-looking and involves many
secondary impacts. Attempts to do so have estimated the price tag to the
United States as reaching into the trillions of dollars annually if patterns do
not change.173 Although the economic, health, and social costs may
potentially be enormous, many will not manifest for decades. This is part of
why federal efforts to significantly scale back U.S. greenhouse gas
emissions have not succeeded.174
Federal policies related to housing and the environment reflect this
inability to gain serious traction. A good example is the federal response to
suburban sprawl. Sprawl is commonly understood to mean low density,
minimally controlled, single use residential development that outpaces
population growth, occurs on urban fringes and is accessible almost
exclusively by automobile.175 Evidence has mounted in recent years of the
170
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many negative environmental externalities resulting from uncontrolled
sprawl, including the loss of wetlands, increased storm water run-off,
increased carbon consumption, and the destruction of wildlife habitats.176
On the one hand, the federal government recognizes sprawl as a significant
problem.177 Congress has empowered the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to regulate certain aspects of land development particularly
critical to managing sprawl such as local storm water management and
wetlands protection.178 The EPA, through its Office of Sustainable
Communities, encourages local and state planners, through funding and
educational resources, to implement “Smart Growth” techniques that
minimize negative environmental impacts in constructing new residential
communities and re-designing existing ones.179 Other federal agencies, like
HUD, the Department of Transportation, and FEMA, have recently forged
partnerships with the EPA to coordinate their housing and infrastructure
funding to provide more leverage for the construction of environmentally
sustainable communities.180
On the other hand, the federal government leaves individual development
decisions in the hands of state and local governments,181 many of which pay
no mind to and lack a significant incentive to adopt Smart Growth
principles. The degree of attention that environmental sustainability
receives has varied based on who leads the relevant federal departments and
agencies, which has led to a lack of consistency in policy implementation.
Furthermore, many have suggested that long-standing, pro-growth policies
of the federal government, like the construction and expansion of federal
highways, have been instrumental in encouraging suburban sprawl (a
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contention that a comprehensive Government Accountability Office study
on the topic has contested).182
Meanwhile, federal policy has been clearer and more consistent in
mitigating the financial risks of those who choose to reside in
environmental hot spots. Damages homeowners in these places incur due to
severe weather events become negative housing externalities because of the
federal government’s long standing policy of providing taxpayer-funded
disaster relief. For example, Congress and the executive branch have
typically rushed to the aid of coastal areas hit hardest by hurricanes and
super storms. This assistance has gone well beyond emergency assistance
and included helping these higher risk communities rebuild homes and
homeowners recover financial losses due to home damage.183 The federal
price tag for storm recovery packages since Hurricane Katrina in 2004 was
$200 billion prior to Hurricane Harvey.184 Estimates of projected damage
from Hurricane Harvey alone are in the range of $180 billion, much of
which the federal government will cover.185
Part of these federal aid packages cover deficits in the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP), which insures homeowners in high flood risk
areas due to the shortage of private insurance options. NFIP homeowner
insurance premiums historically run far short of homeowner flood claims,
resulting in a deficit of between $16 billion and $25 billion for years 2002
through 2013, which taxpayers ultimately have had to pay.186 More
recently, Congress has simply started buying out homeowners in high-risk
coastal communities (termed “climate change refugees”), recognizing that it
may be cheaper in the long-run to demolish the homes rather than having to
continually bail them out. Congress has already allocated $1 billion in
dollars to HUD for home purchase and resettlement programs, and Houston
is expected to add to the demand.187
182
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Relationship to Homeowner Subsidies

As just discussed, certain homeowner choices do greater harm to the
environment than others, although a significant portion of these negative
housing externalities will be borne by future generations. Also, certain
choices place homeowners in more environmentally vulnerable locations,
and a portion of these costs are incurred more immediately by all taxpayers
as a result of federal disaster relief policies. The homeowner subsidies
could serve as one way to discourage those decisions that impose more of
these negative housing externalities and encourage those that impose less.
Yet, once again, the homeowner subsidies provide virtually no help.
Neutral as they are to location and form, they neither encourage nor
discourage a prospective homeowner’s decisions to, for example, live in a
community that is near or far from an urban center, public transportation, or
an environmentally sensitive or vulnerable area, even though these
decisions vary significantly in the price tag they impose on others. Federal
policy focuses much more on responding to severe damage that follows
from environmental and natural catastrophes, than on proactively
influencing housing decisions that reduce environmental harm or
susceptibility in the first place.
Some would go a step further and argue that the subsidies have
encouraged certain negative externality producing choices like suburban
sprawl.188 Across almost all metropolitan areas, the benefits of tax subsidies
are claimed with greater frequency by those living in suburban and exurban
areas, where lot sizes and home are bigger.189 Homeowners in these areas
utilize the subsidies not as an incentive to purchase a home, but rather as an
incentive to purchase a bigger home on a larger lot.190 Accordingly, these
studies contend that a primary effect of the subsidies has been the
construction of larger, “McMansion” style homes that are an average of 250
to 1000 square feet larger than necessary.191
At the same time, it should be noted that federal tax policy has recently
made some inroads in encouraging greater energy efficiency in homes,
although they are often marketed primarily as ways to cut consumer energy
COMMUNITIES OPT FOR MANAGED RETREAT 26 (Lincoln Inst., 2016).
188
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bills rather than as reducing negative housing externalities. Congress has
passed an array of tax incentives for home-builders, home appliance
makers, and consumers aimed at spurring the supply of and demand for
energy efficient homes and home products.192 For homeowners, these have
taken the form of federal income tax credits for the purchase of energy
efficient appliances, certain home improvements that increase energy
efficiency, and the installation of renewable energy systems.193 Sustained
commitment to the homeowner subsidies has been relatively weak,
however. The homeowner energy tax credits have been small and subject to
low overall caps, raising concerns that they did not act as much of an
incentive.194 Most of the credits recently expired, and there appears to be
little political will in Congress to renew them.
V.

UNDERSTANDING THE DISCONNECT (HOW AND WHY CURRENT
HOMEOWNER SUBSIDIES ARE NOT SMART)

As Part IV demonstrated, a striking disconnect exists between the
homeowner subsidies and other key federal housing-related policies as well
as the negative housing externalities they seek to contain. Why? The current
subsidies are not smart. This Part explains what “smart” means for purposes
of this analysis, as well as how and why the subsidies fail to meet the mark.
A.

What are “Smart” Subsidies?

When it comes to evaluating policies, rather than people, “smart” has a
variety of possible meanings, several of which are relevant here. One use of
the word is in connection with a system change that deploys resources more
strategically to improve performance and reduce inefficiencies associated
with its use. For example, “smart” energy grids deploy energy based on
two-way communications with consumers in order to reduce waste, lower
costs, and make power outages less likely.195
The current homeowner subsidies are inefficient in that they reward
homeowner decisions at large, and without regard to the negative
192
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externalities homeowner decisions impose. As a result, at best, the federal
government gets very little bang in containing these externalities for the
very significant buck it spends promoting homeownership.196 At worst, it
must pay to clean up damage resulting from homeowner choices it
subsidizes.197
“Smart” subsidies would reduce these inefficiencies by targeting
financial incentives at homeowner decisions that also offset or reduce
negative housing externalities. For example, as explained in Part IV.C,
homeowner decisions to build new homes in higher risk coastal and
floodplain areas can increase federal taxpayer burdens due to the
government’s policy of providing disaster relief and increase flooding risk
for those who already live in the area. A smarter homeowner subsidy in
these areas might be limited to those who purchase homes that are built to
maximize storm water absorption and/or minimize the likelihood of
flooding damage.198
A separate, though not unrelated, use of “smart” is in connection with
policies that advance “sustainable development.” Development decisions
that are sustainable take into account their impact on others, including
future generations.199 The replacement of combined sewer and storm water
systems that discharge into fresh water sources during large rainfalls with
those that can instead temporarily store this water underground is an
example of sustainable development. “Smart” is frequently used
synonymously with “sustainable” when referring to places that implement
sustainability practices (e.g. “Smart Cities”), especially when those places
use advances in information and communication technology to do so.200
When used in this way, “smart” has a normative component. Sustainable
development has specific environmental, economic, and social goals. These
include protecting the planet from environmental degradation, conserving
natural resources, striving for economic growth that does not heighten
socioeconomic segmentation, and creating places to live that are inclusive,
safe, and resilient.201 The federal housing policies that are the subject of
196
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Part IV fit comfortably within these goals. So, as with the first meaning of
the word discussed above, “smart” in this instance means policies that
minimize the negative externalities associated with development. The
current homeowner subsidies are not smart because they are completely
insensitive to them.
Another definition of “smart” has emerged in the technology field. Smart
devices are those that are capable of sensing a particular user’s needs or a
change in environment and modifying their performance accordingly.202
Smart data refers to data that can be analyzed and converted to actionable
insights to address a particular problem.203 The key concepts are
individualized, adaptable, and actionable.
These concepts are meaningful to crafting effective housing strategies.
This is because housing markets are highly localized. The United States
consists not of one nor even of fifty housing markets, but rather thousands
of highly localized markets that vary significantly in strengths and
challenges. For example, high density cities with robust economies have
thriving real estate markets by most measures, but grapple with inadequate
supply and affordability issues, particularly for low and middle income
homeowners.204 Post-industrial Rust Belt cities have more anemic housing
markets with vast inventories of antiquated or deteriorating vacant homes
that deplete surrounding home values and pose public health issues.205
Certain coastal areas face rising tides, and need to re-think how, where, and
whether housing exists.206 New growth Southwestern cities face high
demand, but limited natural resources to support this demand.207 Within
each of these local housing markets exist even smaller submarkets that
reflect different amenities, job access, and housing stock, among other
factors. Smart homeowner subsidies would be perceptive and adaptable
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enough to address different problems in different places. By this standard
too, the current homeowner subsidies are clearly not smart. They are
simplistic and monolithic with no intended sensitivity to the challenges
faced by different housing markets and submarkets.
So a definition of smarter homeowner subsidies is emerging. They would
be more carefully targeted, aiming to increase the social benefits (or reduce
the social costs) that follow from homeowner decisions and capable of
adaptation among and within different housing markets.
B.

Why the Current Homeowner Subsidies Are Not Smart

Before considering whether and how smarter federal homeowner
subsidies are feasible, it is helpful to understand why the current subsidies
are designed as they are. This article offers three explanations.
1.

Idealization of Homeownership

One explanation is a historic cultural attitude in which the homeowner
subsidies are rooted that views all homeownership as “good” (in economistspeak, resulting only in positive internalities and externalities). The federal
government has long idealized homeownership as possessing multiple
virtues that have since gained popular acceptance. Perhaps foremost is the
view first popularized in the 1920s and 1930s that homeownership
promotes good citizenship and stable communities, appealing qualities
during the social unrest and political radicalism that followed from mass
urbanization in the early 20th century.208 In the ensuing decades, the
government saw the expansion of homeownership as the means to address a
host of social, economic, and political problems, including post-World War
II population expansion, slum removal, and racial unrest.209 Towards the
end of the century, in the context of rising home prices and a shift away
from New Deal and welfare state policies, politicians cast homeownership
as an ideal vehicle for household savings and the accumulation of wealth.210
From the perspective of the federal government, then, homeownership
has typically been something to promote rather than regulate. This approach
finds support in the U.S. Constitution’s deference to state and local
governments on matters of land use and sacrosanct view of private property
rights.211 Congress has occasionally intervened to legislate on certain land
208
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use matters, like environmental protection and housing discrimination,
when it has determined that relying on more localized levels of
governmental to independently regulate will fail to consistently or
adequately address significant harm to others.212 It has also used its tax and
spend authority to offer financial incentives to prompt state and local
governments to take action that reflects federal concerns.213 But as it relates
to individual homeowners, federal policy has focused more on creating
opportunities to own homes than on trying to meaningfully influence where
or in what types of homes homeowners live. The design of the homeowner
subsidies reflects this mindset.
2.

Administrative Simplicity

Like many federal tax code adjustments to taxable income, the
homeowner subsidies are tax incentives trapped in the bodies of exclusions
and deductions from taxable income. Exclusions and deductions are
different devices for accomplishing the same task—i.e. removing otherwise
taxable dollars from tax.214 The difference between them is primarily a
matter of timing. An exclusion keeps otherwise taxable dollars from
entering a taxpayer’s pool of gross income in the first place, while a
deduction subtracts them from a taxpayer’s gross income in the process of
tabulating her taxable income.
Exclusions and deductions are straightforward, effective, and easy to
justify mechanisms for removing dollars from a household’s tax base that
Congress believes do not really constitute income (a “normative”
adjustment).215 They are also easy to administer as the taxpayer simply
claims them on her return. The tax savings on exclusions and deductions
Diagnostic Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, 23 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 821 (2006).
212
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213
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214
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215
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are greater for higher income taxpayers because, as explained earlier, the
amount excluded or deducted would be taxed at a higher marginal rate.216
But this should not be a concern from a policy perspective, because the
amounts removed do not fall within a normative definition of income and
so are not properly taxable in the first place.
More controversially, Congress has also employed exclusions and
deductions to accomplish social policy. For example, the tax code provides
a deduction for college tuition and fees up to $4,000 per year to encourage
taxpayers (and their dependents) to go to college.217 It is when influencing
social policy that exclusions and deductions are susceptible to becoming
upside down subsidies because they are more valuable to high income
taxpayers than low income ones.218 In fact, many have questioned why
Congress, when its intent is to encourage certain social behavior, does not
use a more flexible, less regressive mechanism like grants.219 To address
this problem, many exclusions and deductions come packaged with income
caps, and other income-sensitive limitations.220 If not carefully crafted,
exclusions and deductions meant to encourage social behavior can be
regressive, overbroad, and blunt instruments.
This is the case with the homeowner subsidies. The income and benefit
limitations on homeowner subsidies do not meaningfully alter their
regressive qualities.221 It is the reason that the subsidies don’t even do a
good job of accomplishing their ostensible purpose of making
homeownership more accessible. Some commentators have identified
normative reasons or other justifications for each of the homeowner
subsidies that could account for their packaging as deductions and
exclusions.222 The more plausible read is that they took the form of what
216
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were, at the times they originated, the simplest and most conventional
mechanisms for creating tax preferences, without much regard for their
regressivity or effectiveness in actually promoting homeownership.223
3.

Political Entrenchment

The final explanation is political. Once entrenched, tax expenditures are
very difficult to modify, even in the face of substantial criticism. Taxpayers
and industry groups come to expect the financial benefits associated with a
particular tax break and, if those impacted are broad and powerful enough,
any proposed significant cutback invites peril for those political actors who
support it.
This has certainly been the case for the homeowner subsidies, often
described as one of the “third rails” of American politics.224 The subsidies
benefit a powerful coalition of political interests. Those who receive the
lion’s share of the benefits are upper middle income households, who vote
in high proportions and, even more significantly, make up the donor base of
both major political parties.225 Because housing prices are significantly
higher in large coastal cities, homeowners in these areas also benefit
disproportionately from the homeowner subsidies.226 Interestingly, many of
the more liberal politicians, who would otherwise push hardest against
subsidies distributed so heavily in favor of the wealthy, represent these
coastal cities and, in pursuit of their constituents’ interests, defend the
subsidies.227 And then there is the highly vested and vociferous
participation of two of the nation’s largest and most broadly influential
special interest groups—the National Association of Realtors and the
National Association of Homebuilders.228 At the first sign of any potential
223
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roll back of the homeowner subsidies, these groups spring to action and let
their dissatisfaction be known in ways that have caused even the staunchest
of tax loophole closers to tread carefully.229
At first glance, political theorists would refer to the challenge of rolling
back the homeowner subsidies as a case of reform that has concentrated
costs and highly diffuse benefits, which is among the most difficult to
enact.230 That is to say that, in this instance, the losses resulting from
eliminating all or part of the subsidies are concentrated among a distinct
group who are highly motivated to vocalize opposition (and politically
powerful).231 Meanwhile, the resulting benefits would be spread out among
the population at large, potentially simply through increasing the
government’s tax revenue. This means the potential beneficiaries have had
little motivation to support reform.232
Some additional factors have added to the intractability of the status quo.
The first is that even though the lion’s share of the benefits go to upper
middle and high income taxpayers, many households receive at least a
small bump from the homeowner subsidies and, thus, see themselves as
vested in their survival. For example, most homeowners can claim the
capital gains exclusion on home sales, even if lower-income households see
a much smaller benefit.233 The second is that some economists and virtually
all industry group experts have predicted a housing market Armageddon if
the homeowner subsidies are removed.234 This is predicated on the
assumption that the subsidies have been capitalized into higher home
prices, which will fall if the subsidies disappear, decreasing the value of the
principal asset of many homeowners.235 Although the extent to which home
prices would fall (and exactly for whom they would fall) is unclear, the
mere notion that it could happen has had a stifling effect on reform.236
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The result is that the homeowner subsidies have come to function like
entitlements, reserved primarily for upper two income quintiles of
American households, rather than strategic investments, adaptable to
different housing markets and capable of containing negative housing
externalities. This is not to say that there is no hope for smarter homeowner
subsidies. But the tasks of designing and implementing them are
challenging ones.
VI.

IN SEARCH OF SMARTER HOMEOWNER SUBSIDIES

While they have proven very difficult to roll back, calls for reform of one
or more of the homeowner subsidies are virtually unceasing. A long line of
policy analysts, economists, tax experts, and legislators from places that
experience less benefit from the subsidies have turned the mortgage interest
deduction, in particular, into a popular punching bag.237 Three consecutive
Presidential administrations have started down the path towards reform,
although none to date have succeeded.238
A.

An Assessment of Current Proposals

Variations abound, but the proposals for reform by and large fall into two
principal camps. The first camp seeks to eliminate or reduce the
homeowner subsidies without replacing them.239 At the root of this
approach are contentions that the subsidies either do not work or are not
defensible, and should not be used.240 Common to this line of criticism are
claims that homeowner subsidies unfairly preference homeowners over
renters, inflate home prices, and require all taxpayers to foot the bill for the
housing preference of one segment of the population.241 A more equitable
approach would be to use the money spent on the subsidies to lower
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everyone’s taxes and let them make up their own mind as to whether to rent
or own.242
Recent Republican tax reform proposals emanate from this camp,
although they are mindful of the political risks of proposing a complete
elimination of long-standing tax breaks.243 They propose significantly
increasing the standard deduction, which would reduce the number of
taxpayers who would find the MID and SALT valuable (without making
them worse off financially) while lowering marginal tax rates, which would
reduce the value of these deductions to those who would still claim them.244
Some proposals also call for imposing or lowering caps on one or more of
the subsidies to limit to what extent homeowners, especially higher income
ones, can claim them.245 The tax revenue gained from these caps would be
used to pay for lower overall tax rates.
The second camp wants to improve the performance of the homeowner
subsidies and in particular the MID, in making homeownership more
affordable for those who are financially constrained. The central contention
in this camp is that the subsidies would work better if they were built better.
Most of these proposals call for converting the mortgage interest deduction
to a tax credit designed to ensure low and middle income homebuyers can
take advantage of it.246
A tax credit is a dollar for dollar reduction in how much a taxpayer owes,
as opposed to an exclusion or deduction, which reduces the amount of
income on which the taxpayer must pay tax.247 So a tax credit is potentially
of equal value to all taxpayers, no matter their tax bracket, if they have tax
liability to offset. Some tax credits go further and are “refundable,” which
means the IRS will pay the full amount of the credit to the person claiming
it even if the credit exceeds the claimant’s tax liability (or the claimant has
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no tax liability at all).248 These features make the tax credit approach
popular among reformers who seek to use the tax code to encourage
homeownership without creating an upside-down subsidy. Capping the
amount of a mortgage that qualifies for the credit goes even further in
equalizing the benefit. For example, a 2005 tax reform panel established by
President George W. Bush recommended converting the mortgage interest
deduction to a flat tax credit equal to 15% of the mortgage interest a
homeowner pays each year, but limiting the maximum amount of the
mortgage eligible for the credit to 125% of a community’s median local
home price.249
This article agrees with both camps that the homeowner subsidies ought
to be reformed. The evidence is overwhelming that the current subsidies
primarily encourage those who are relatively affluent and would already
buy homes to buy larger and more expensive ones. This is neither the
purported objective of the subsidies nor responsive to a separate market
failure.
This article agrees with the second camp but disagrees with the first
camp as to the defensibility of the concept of homeowner subsidies.
Ensuring that a sufficient supply of affordable housing exists to shelter
citizens is a legitimate interest of government. Housing affordability is a
persistent and growing challenge for low and middle income households
throughout the country, especially in this era of growing income disparity.
Moreover, although the subject of debate, many have cited to the positive
internalities and externalities associated with homeownership.250 So if the
government is to be in the field of subsidizing housing at all, then making
homeownership more attainable and affordable, as an alternative to renting,
is defensible. The proposals from the second camp are undeniably more
efficient and equitable ways of accomplishing that objective than the
current homeowner subsidies and very likely more so than proposals from
the first camp.251
However, the proposals from these two camps are not, on their face,
smarter subsidies in the way Part V describes. One could speculate that
either an elimination or roll back of the current homeowner subsidies or a
conversion to an affordability oriented tax credit might incidentally reduce
248
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some of the negative housing externalities discussed in Part IV. For
example, higher income households would either receive no or less
mortgage based tax relief under any of those proposals and, thus, have less
incentive to seek out larger and more expensive homes on low density lots
or in exclusive neighborhoods. Also, lower and middle income and
minority households might see lower housing prices (if one or more of the
current homeowner subsidies are eliminated) or increased buying power (if
affordability-oriented tax credits are adopted) and so presumably would
have greater ability to move into and integrate neighborhoods of
opportunity. On the other hand, one could also speculate as to how certain
negative housing externalities might be exacerbated. The push of additional
households into more affluent suburban and exurban areas could exacerbate
sprawl and accelerate disinvestment and further isolation of marginalized
communities. Furthermore, the proposals from the two main camps are not
adaptable to address the varying range of strengths and challenges faced by
different housing markets.
The bottom line is that none of the proposals from these two camps are
specifically engineered to be “smarter” as this article envisions. In that
sense, they represent missed opportunities to turn homeowner subsidies into
tools for meaningfully reducing negative housing externalities. The aim of
the rest of this article is to consider whether and how smarter homeowner
subsidies might be engineered.
A critical starting point is to recognize that different homeowner choices
as to home location and form result in different amounts and types of
housing externalities. Accordingly, rather than rewarding homeowner
decisions at large and in roughly equivalent ways, smarter homeowner
subsidies should be equipped to reward certain decisions, but not others, or
to do so in varying amounts according to the housing externalities they
generate.
A smaller contingent of reformers has offered ideas on allocating
homeowner subsidies more strategically and selectively. As part of a
package of reforms aimed at improving affordability in inelastic, supplyconstrained housing markets, Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko have
called for capping the mortgage interest deduction for homeowners in those
markets and rebating the resulting tax revenue to local government in
exchange for its efforts to increase housing supply.252 The goal would be to
reduce overall home prices and allow more households to access these
opportunity-rich markets.253 In the midst of cleanup efforts from the
foreclosure crisis, Alan Mallach called for eliminating or scaling back the
252
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MID and investing the tax revenue gained into a package of investor and
homeowner tax credits to encourage private reinvestment in “tipping point”
neighborhoods.254 Roberta Mann proposed replacing the MID with tax
credits that incentivize the purchase of modest sized homes and those
located near public transit as a strategy for reducing urban sprawl.255
Meanwhile, Dorothy Brown, among others, has suggested limiting
mortgage interest and property tax subsidies to those living in racially
diverse neighborhoods.256
Each of these proposals is thoughtfully formulated for the housing
market problem it seeks to address. In that sense, each calls for a smarter
form of homeowner subsidy. That said, each drills down on only one type
of problem or negative housing externality and some focus on a challenge
unique to certain types of housing submarkets. The purpose of this article is
to think more systemically and with the aim of identifying a viable
approach for designing homeowner subsidies capable of addressing a
collection of different housing externalities across many different types of
markets and submarkets.
B.

Examining Comparable Subsidies

Fortunately, the slate is not completely blank. State and local
governments are increasingly using demand-side tax subsidies to influence
business and homeowner location and form decisions when they believe
doing so will generate sufficient public benefit within their boundaries to
outweigh the forgone taxes. In fact, the driving force for doing so has often
been to combat negative externalities, like those following from chronic
economic or housing disinvestment. The body of public finance research
that has emerged on the efficacy of these subsidies is worth examining.
A good starting point is the track record on demand-side tax subsidies
meant to attract and retain businesses and encourage job creation. Although
aimed at businesses rather than homeowners, the record is deeper and more
established as many states and localities have engaged in this practice for
254

These are neighborhoods, which HUD would select, that would have experienced a
large number of foreclosures but still have significant assets and market building potential.
ALAN MALLACH, CUT TO INVEST: CREATE NEW BOND AND TAX CREDIT PROGRAMS TO
RESTORE MARKET VITALITY TO AMERICA’S DISTRESSED CITIES AND NEIGHBORHOODS (2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06-land-use-bonds-taxes.pdf.
255
Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the
Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347 (2000).
256
Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 371-74
(2009). See also, Rothstein, supra note 130 (proposing the withholding of the mortgage
interest deduction from racially homogenous communities with exclusionary zoning laws).

2017 / IN SEARCH OF SMARTER HOMEOWNER SUBSIDIES

251

several decades.257 In fact, the practice has become so pervasive that most
businesses seeking to relocate (or simply considering whether to stay put)
have come to expect generous state and local tax abatement to be a part of
the package and often insinuate that they are prepared to go to the highest
bidder. This has led to an unhealthy level of competition and a race to the
bottom among states and cities, in which subsidies are so broadly available,
overly generous and free of conditions that they become unhinged from
accomplishing discernible, and justifiable public benefits.258
In this failure lies an important lesson about the value of carefully
limiting and targeting demand-side tax subsidies. Among those economists
and policy analysts who support business attraction and retention subsidies,
the prevailing opinion is that subsidies for which the resulting benefits
justify the costs are those that are carefully targeted and monitored.259 This
includes being: geographically limited (to those places under great fiscal
stress or where a market failure truly acts as a barrier to entry); right-sized
in terms of amount, scope, and class of eligible recipients to tie closely to
the problem the subsidy seeks to overcome; periodically evaluated to make
sure the subsidy works; and retractable if the business isn’t holding up its
end of the bargain.260 Even many of those skeptical about such subsidies
acknowledge that carefully constructed subsidies approved after a thorough
and open cost-benefit discussion may sometimes be justified.261
Although the subject of less study, even more substantively relevant is
the experience of local governments that have used property tax abatement
to induce prospective homebuyers to buy new homes or substantially
rehabilitate existing homes within their boundaries. Numerous cities have
adopted policies like this in response to steep population declines.262 Their
stated objective is typically to combat the negative externalities that result
from chronic disinvestment in their communities, like the decimation of the
local tax base and the human, social, and economic costs associated with
deteriorating neighborhoods.263

257
Esteban G. Dalehite, John L. Mikesell & C. Kurt Zorn, Variation in Property Tax
Abatement Programs Among States, 19 ECON. DEV. Q. 157 (2005).
258
Id.
259
Id. See also, Gary Sand, Laura A. Resse & Heather L. Khan, Implementing Tax
Abatements in Michigan: A Study of Best Practices, 20 ECON. DEV. Q. 44 (2006).
260
Dalehite, Mikesell & Zorn, supra note 257; Sand, Resse & Khan, supra note 259.
261
See, e.g., William H. Bowen & Chang-Shik Song, Reasons for Misgivings About
Local Economic Development Initiatives, in THE ROAD THROUGH THE RUST BELT.: FROM
PREEMINENCE TO DECLINE IN PROSPERITY 245 (William H. Bowen ed., 2014).
262
Mark S. Rosentraub, Brian Mikelbank & Charlie Post, Residential Property Tax
Abatements and Rebuilding in Cleveland, Ohio, 42 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 104 (2010).
263
Id.

252

University of Hawai‘i Law Review / Vol. 40:1

Here are some of the lessons learned concerning taxes, subsidies and
homeowner decisions. First, tax rates and overall tax burdens associated
with purchasing in different jurisdictions within a region are influential in
homebuyer decisions as to where to locate, especially where supply is
elastic (i.e. comparable alternatives exist in nearby communities).264
Likewise, subsidies in the form of tax breaks are capable of influencing
prospective homebuyer decisions.265 However, they are not the exclusive,
nor even necessarily the driving factor, as to where a homebuyer chooses to
purchase.266 Furthermore, although subsidies can influence behavior, the
challenge is in achieving the desired results.267 For example, residential
property tax abatement in Cleveland, Ohio has been successful in attracting
new high income residents to the city, improving neighboring property
values and even in creating net fiscal gain for the city’s tax base.268 It has
not, however, reversed overall population decline nor improved certain
important neighborhood outcome measurements.269
Success appears to be a result of several factors. These include carefully
tailoring the subsidies to attract the types of development and homeowners
that the locality has determined are important to meet its objectives.270 They
also include vigilance in monitoring the impact of the subsidy to ensure it is
at the correct price point and has the right other features to actually
influence consumer decisions, and the adaptability to adjust the policy as
needed based on this data.271 Subsidies seem to be most viable when they
are not designed in isolation but, rather, cognizant of other factors that
affect homebuyer decision-making in that particular community (e.g.,
public school quality, proximity to metropolitan area, demographic trends)
and ideally as part of a more comprehensive, community strategic
264
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development plan.272 Finally, policymakers should take the long view in
expecting results, as it may take several years to see the type of
improvement that justifies the short-term costs of the subsidies.273
Collectively, these studies suggest the mix of qualities smarter
homeowner subsidies should possess. These types of subsidies work best
when they are tailored, limited, variable, and complementary. Tailored
means crafted to encourage behavior that squarely addresses the identified
problem. If the problem is deteriorating or antiquated housing stock and a
market for housing exists, then appropriately tailored subsidies should fund
home rehabilitation or new construction. If the problem is residential
segregation, then tailored subsidies could include incentivizes for excluded
homeowners to purchase in exclusive communities or non-excluded
homebuyers to purchase in excluded communities.
Limited means not too broadly available. Instead, a subsidy should be
restricted to those individual homeowner decisions demonstrated to achieve
the subsidy’s objective. If the objective of a subsidy is to offset chronic
community disinvestment, then it should not be available to a homebuyer
seeking to purchase in a healthy housing market.
Subsidies should be variable in the sense that they allow for variations
across housing markets and submarkets. As discussed earlier, different
markets face different problems and possess different strengths, and often
contain multiple submarkets. Furthermore, homeowners or prospective
home buyers within one market or submarket may not respond in the same
way as those within others.
In a similar vein, the subsidies should be complementary, in that they
should support, not counteract, other federal, state, and local efforts to
address negative housing externalities. Ideally, subsidies should be
designed so that they coordinate with appropriate community planning and
the investment of other private, public, and philanthropic resources.
As a final note, it bears mention that state and local government tax
abatement, as a means to attract development, is frequently criticized for
being inequitable. This is because relieving the tax burden of one party
typically means that other taxpayers within the jurisdiction must make up
for this forgone revenue or that the jurisdiction simply goes without the
revenue, meaning schools and other local services suffer. Equity objections
may be less intense with federal subsidies, because the tax burdens at issue
272
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are spread out across the entire country rather than across a city.
Furthermore, the current homeowner subsidies are, in fact, highly
inequitable and regressive, and so smarter subsidies may very well serve as
an improvement.274 Nonetheless, a desirable quality of virtually any subsidy
is that it “pencil out”– i.e., demonstrate a net gain and return on investment
for the community. A study of the previously mentioned Cleveland
property tax abatement showed that over time it generated a dollar and a
half of property tax for every dollar abated, and this finding aided
significantly in its renewal.275
C.

Conceptual Models for Smarter Subsidies

Part VI.B looked to state and local examples of smarter subsidies. This is
because there are far fewer examples of federal-level, demand-side
homeowner subsidies that aim to accomplish objectives other than
rewarding homeownership at large or making it more affordable. Perhaps
this is because it is challenging to conceive of a subsidy (or collection of
subsidies) that works across thousands of different housing markets that
experience and are responding to a range of different housing externalities
in a variety of different ways. There is an inherent tension between the
highly tailored qualities of the ideal subsidy and designing an approach that
could work across the board. Nevertheless, three models present
theoretically plausible approaches and are worth discussion here.
1.

Subsidy Eligible/Ineligible Zones

The first model is to adopt a single homeowner subsidy aimed at
reducing homeownership costs, but to make it only claimable by those
whose homeownership decision also reduces other negative housing
externalities. An example would be offering the subsidy to homeowners
who live in communities that are disinvested or disinvesting. Or, to those
who purchase median-sized homes in the built environment or within new
development boundaries designed to reduce suburban sprawl. Or, to those
who purchase homes in racially integrated neighborhoods. The latter two
solutions are similar to those posed by Professors Mann and Brown,
respectively.276 In any of these scenarios, the end result would probably be
a complicated national map of subsidy-eligible and ineligible zones.
274
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A model like this would have the potential to reduce whatever negative
housing externality or externalities at which the subsidy was aimed on a
grand scale. Take the example of a subsidy aimed at encouraging
homeownership in disinvested communities. Homeowners in these
communities would receive a considerable discount on their housing costs,
while homeowners in communities with normally functioning housing
markets would not. Using a hypothetical $4,000 annual subsidy,277 a
homeowner in a qualifying community would receive a $40,000 discount
on housing costs over a ten-year period (the average homeowner tenure).
This level of subsidy would presumably drive some segment of
homeowners to purchase homes in disinvested communities and others to
stay put. Demand for homes in qualifying communities would probably
increase, as would private investment, home prices, and the tax base. Over
time, increased tax revenue should help to improve public services while
decreasing crime, public health risks, and infrastructure concerns.
There are, however, several challenges with a solution along these
barriers. One challenge relates to the degree of tailoring that may be
required to ensure that the subsidy accomplishes its objective. For example,
what amount of subsidy would be necessary to impact homeowner
decisions? Would that amount need to vary by community based on
regional home prices? What constitutes a “disinvested community”? At
what point is it no longer considered disinvested, such that subsidies can be
eliminated? If a community reached that point, would a separate subsidy
need to remain in place for lower income households to keep homes
affordable as prices rise?
Moreover, how would policymakers account for other, more communityspecific variations? For example, a disinvested community near a high
growth area might turn around quickly, at which point gentrification
becomes a concern. On the other hand, in a Rust Belt city with too much
housing stock, the city might prefer to limit the subsidy to “tipping point”
neighborhoods (those with greater turnaround potential) and redeploy
277
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largely abandoned neighborhoods to park space or wetland recovery. In
dealing with thousands of communities, it is easy to imagine that many
different types of development scenarios could emerge and that some level
of variability in how a subsidy is deployed would be important. Analogous
sets of questions would undoubtedly arise for subsidies targeted at other
negative housing externalities.
Allowing for subsidies that are highly tailored to work in particular
communities also raises the possibility of an unaddressed constitutional
issue. The Uniformity Clause of the United States Constitution requires that
federal tax code provisions apply uniformly throughout the United States.278
Theoretically, this clause prohibits Congress from enacting tax provisions
that distinguish taxpayers in one geographic area over those in another.279
The very limited case law has applied the provision quite narrowly,
allowing tax laws to stand provided they discuss the distinction in
nongeographic terms or where it is at least possible that they could do so.280
In other words, the Uniformity Clause does not prohibit Congress from
making a tax distinction based on “geographically isolated problems”281
(such as, presumably, community disinvestment, residential segregation, or
environmental harm), as long as this distinction is motivated by the
condition and not “actual geographic discrimination.”282 While this
interpretation appears to provide a good deal of leeway for Congress to
craft tax subsidies tailored to address negative housing externalities that
occur in particular housing markets, it also indicates some theoretic outer
limits on allowing specific housing market refinements to these
subsidies.283 To address this concern, Congress could provide the subsidies
outside of the tax code (for example, as HUD-administered grants).
Another challenge is that the disinvested community subsidy addresses
only one type of negative housing externality. Would it aid, hamper, or be
inconsequential as it relates to other externalities? It is reasonable to
speculate that some overlap exists. For example, incentivizing moves to
racially integrated neighborhoods would probably reduce socioeconomic
segregation, given that poverty rates are significantly higher among certain
278
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racial groups.284 These incentives might also aid in the reduction of
suburban sprawl, because minority households are disproportionately
located in older, urban areas that white households may move into in order
to obtain the subsidy. On the other hand, this type of subsidy may also have
the opposite effect. More economically mobile minority households may
move from older urban areas into newer, suburban, and exurban
communities, increasing demand for this type of housing and further
isolating those left behind. Policymakers would then be left either to
determine which negative externalities matter most and prioritize
accordingly, or to try and craft a map of subsidy eligible and ineligible
areas that is responsive to each of the externalities or most socially
beneficially in the aggregate. Then, there is the question of how to treat
individual homes that cause fewer negative housing externalities (say a
home fully powered by solar energy), but sit in non-qualifying communities
(e.g., one with a thriving local housing market). Marshalling information to
pinpoint areas and homes that represent socially optimal homeowner
decisions would be daunting.
Yet another concern is the potential impact on homeowners living in
areas or in homes that would no longer qualify for homeowner subsidies.
As demand would increase for qualifying communities and homes, it
inevitably would decrease for non-qualifying communities and homes. This
would reduce home prices and homeowner equity in the latter, although the
extent is unknown and depends to some degree on how fully capitalized the
current homeowner subsidies are into a particular community’s home
prices. Nonetheless, some homeowners could see a significant drop in the
value of their homes, which could call into serious question the fairness and
political viability of this type of approach.
2.

À La Carte Subsidies

A second model would involve Congress authorizing a broader range of
separate subsidies, each targeted at a type of homeowner decision that
serves to reduce a type of negative housing externality. Think of this as the
à la carte approach. One subsidy, like a tax credit that offsets a percentage
of a homeowner’s mortgage interest expenses, could be widely available in
order to promote affordability. On top of that, Congress could stack
additional subsidies to encourage specific homeowner behavior, such as
making qualifying home repairs in a community with older housing stock,
purchasing a LEED certified home, and purchasing a home in an integrated
neighborhood.
284
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Congress has actually used this model in the recent past. Between 2005
and 2016, it provided a collection of federal income tax credits to
homeowners who purchased energy efficient appliances, made specified
home improvements that increase energy efficiency, and installed
renewable energy systems for their homes.285 A principal underlying
rationale was to encourage homeowner purchases that reduce the negative
environmental
externalities
resulting
from
residential
energy
consumption.286 Between 2008 and 2010, Congress also made available a
tax credit of up to $8,000 for first-time homebuyers (later expanded to
include many other homebuyers) to help stabilize the national housing
market as home prices tumbled during the foreclosure crisis.287
The à la carte approach also has the potential to impact the behavior of a
substantial number of homeowners and, therefore, reduce negative housing
externalities on a large scale. The credits would offset the perceived or
actual costs of certain socially beneficial homeowner behavior—like
repairing an older home when the homeowner would otherwise be unlikely
to fully recoup the costs. This helps not only the homeowner who receives
the subsidy, but also has potential spillover effects on neighboring
homeowners whose homes might increase in value as a result and who then
would be more likely to make similar repairs.
One challenge with the presumably smaller,288 à la carte subsidies is
designing them so that they actually prompt the desired behavior and have
the desired impact. Both the homeowner energy credits and first-time
homebuyer credit faced questions as to whether they served as effective
incentives.289 The individual energy credits were relatively small and also
subject to low overall caps raising concerns that they did not act as much of
an incentive and instead were mostly claimed as a windfall by those who
already planned to make the subsidized investments.290 The homebuyer tax
285
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credit was larger, caused home purchases to rise over a two year period, and
probably helped keep the national housing market from total freefall.291 But
whether it increased the overall homeownership rate or even had a
sufficient long-term stabilizing impact on housing prices are largely in
question. Because the credit had an expiration date, many analysts
wondered if it simply caused those who already planned to purchase a home
to do so earlier.292
Moreover, the à la carte approach is potentially a scatter shot strategy.
Unless carefully coordinated, a subsidy might support a homeowner
decision that reduces one negative externality while simultaneously
increasing others. For example, a homeowner might claim a renewable
energy tax credit for putting solar panels on a new McMansion built on a
floodplain.
Finally, as with the first approach, policymakers would face the
challenge of crafting subsidies at the national level to work in thousands of
different housing submarkets. A home rehabilitation tax credit that
incentivizes the repair of a historic home in a tipping point neighborhood
with rebound potential may make perfect sense. On the other hand, the use
of that subsidy to repair an antiquated home in a mostly abandoned
neighborhood where new construction or re-purposing is a better strategy
may make much less sense.
3.

Community and Project Level Subsidies

A third model represents the other side of the coin, in that it is more
bottom up than top down. Congress could authorize homeowner subsidies
to be allocated on a community-by-community or project-by-project basis
and in coordination with other community or public sector efforts to
address negative housing externalities in a comprehensive way.
This type of subsidy could be deployed in a couple of different scenarios.
One scenario would be in support of housing development proposed as part
of locally driven, community planning that meets federally prescribed
standards. For example, in Cleveland, Ohio, a coalition of community
organizations, city and county agencies, and local technical assistance
providers have prepared a comprehensive land use plan in response to a
recognition that regional population decline and changing land-use patterns
means the city has more developed property than it can sustain in the
291
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foreseeable future.293 The plan, called “Re-imagining a More Sustainable
Cleveland,” has been adopted by the Cleveland City Planning Commission
and it proposes strategic redeployment of land in ways that stabilize and
begin to revitalize neighborhoods with development potential, while
devoting other land to green infrastructure (e.g. parks and storm water
management), agriculture and energy generation.294
If a plan like this meets prescribed standards for community
participation, sustainability, and the reduction of negative externalities, the
federal government could approve homeowner subsidies for use in those
neighborhoods that the plan targeted as having the potential for residential
revitalization. In this way, the subsidies would be more selectively available
in circumstances where informed local actors could demonstrate that
spurring homeownership or a particular type of homeowner behavior would
be highly beneficial. The subsidies would serve as one arrow in a quiver of
strategies that a community might use to engage in strategic development.
When used in this scenario, the homeowner subsidy should almost certainly
take the form of grants rather than tax code subsidies to avoid the potential
Uniformity Clause concerns identified in the discussion of the first
model.295
Another scenario could be in support of other government-funded
housing development programs aimed at reducing one or more negative
externalities. For example, over the past few decades, two major federal
programs—HOPE VI and now the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative—have
sought to replace distressed public and assisted housing projects with better
quality mixed-income housing in order to reduce residential segregation
and break up concentrations of poverty.296 Very recently, a coalition of
community development advocates launched a campaign for a new form of
financing called the Neighborhood Housing Tax Credit, aimed at
incentivizing developers and lenders to finance the construction and
rehabilitation of housing that would attract moderate and middle income
households to disinvested neighborhoods.297 These are both examples of
293
Neighborhood Progress, Inc. & Cleveland City Planning Comm’n, RE-IMAGINING A
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supply side initiatives aimed at reducing negative housing externalities.
Offering homeowner subsidies directly to potential homebuyers in
developments like these would provide a corresponding demand side
incentive that could significantly increase the likelihood of success of these
programs.
This third approach is also the flipside of the other two in terms of its
advantages and challenges. It serves as a much better vehicle for
incorporating the unique aspects of each particular community’s housing
market and submarkets into the allocation of subsidies. It coordinates with
community planning and the investment of other public resources, and thus
is likely to be highly complementary to local efforts to impact housing
conditions. Because targeting of the subsidies originates at the local level
where knowledge of the housing market is greatest identifying development
that addresses all or most of the negative housing externalities also seems
more achievable. The involvement of local policymakers might make
monitoring the impact of the subsidies over time and adapting them as
necessary much easier.
Of course, there are challenges as well. This model would not catalyze
substantial changes in homeowner behavior in one fell swoop as the other
models potentially would. Changes would come about more gradually and
sporadically. Deciding on and overseeing the allocation of subsidies on a
project-by-project basis would also be more administratively burdensome
and necessarily require significantly more federal time, attention and
expense.
This approach also assumes, especially in the scenario in which the
subsidies would complement community planning, capacity at the local
level across the country to generate comprehensive and useful plans that
meet federal standards and take into account multiple forms of housing
externalities. Federal funds and involvement to help interested, but capacity
lacking, communities achieve this would probably be necessary. This is to
say nothing of the increased susceptibility of locally driven processes to
political and private interest influence and corruption. Coordinating this
type of a program across such a large and diverse landscape could be a tall
task.
On the other hand, the federal government does have experience in
overseeing similarly structured programs. Of particular relevance is the
Community Development Block Grant program, which involves the
allocation of federal investments in community development to local
governments for implementation in response to planning priorities

2017) (summary of its recent campaign).
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identified at the local level.298 Using the infrastructure of an existing
program, like CDBG, to allocate homeowner subsidies, rather than starting
from scratch, could help overcome some of the administrative concerns.
D.

Data and Innovation as Gateways to Smarter Subsidies

As noted throughout this article, a significant challenge to making
homeowner subsidies smarter under any model is understanding the
housing externalities at play within thousands of different housing markets
and submarkets, and engineering the subsidies to be precise and sensitive
enough to address these externalities. In this respect, the world is changing
rapidly and in ways that portend success.
The real estate industry, like many others, is in the midst of a data
revolution. Online sources are compiling and making readily accessible
property specific data on everything ranging from owner, parcel and
building information, mortgages and liens, code violations, past sales
history, crime and fire history, and more.299 Simultaneously, a data
analytics industry has emerged. Firms in this industry have developed
sophisticated algorithms and valuation models, which, coordinated with
geographic mapping technology, can process spools of available data and
translate it into digestible, real time, accurate market assessments of local
housing conditions.300
Predictably, much of the data analytics industry serves banks, insurance
companies and mortgage servicers.301 However, a separate and growing
segment of the industry, consisting of both nonprofit and for-profit entities,
focuses on community planning and revitalization.302 Community leaders
and local governments are working with these service providers to
incorporate property and neighborhood specific data into more
sophisticated, forward looking, and sustainable development plans.
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There are many examples of this type of planning. Cities like Detroit,303
Cincinnati,304 Kansas City,305 and Memphis,306 each confronted by large
stockpiles of vacant and distressed properties, are creating data infused
mapping interfaces covering every property within their boundaries. This
visual mapping technology allows community leaders and agencies to more
efficiently determine what code enforcement, demolition and rehabilitation
strategies for which properties make the best (i.e. smartest) use of their
resources. In Cleveland, a community development funding intermediary
recently hired a “spatial econometrics” firm to use hedonic pricing models
to determine which types of homes, if rehabilitated, would yield the highest
increases in surrounding property values.307 This is another data-based
mechanism for prioritizing the spending of a city’s limited public and
philanthropic revitalization funds, in this case specifically to maximize
positive externalities on neighbors and the local tax base.
Smaller cities are getting into the game as well. Danville, Virginia, a
former mill town, is just one example of a city with a size, location and
economic base that suggests continued population stagnancy and perhaps
even further contraction. Rather than simply letting development happen as
it will and spread out further, Danville’s planning department worked with
an urban development consulting firm to create a multi-tiered housing plan
within the city’s current footprint. The plan delineates separate areas for
targeted demolition, rehabilitation and growth based on what future
homeowners are likely to seek and population projections.308 Meanwhile,
the Center for Neighborhood Progress, a national nonprofit, has begun
offering publications and technical assistance aimed at helping communities
303
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large and small develop the capacity to use data to shape planning and
revitalization decisions.309
For sake of illustration, the above examples have focused on the use of
property data, technology, and analytics to address community
disinvestment. But these advances are also taking place with respect to the
other negative housing externalities this article addresses. For example,
HUD developed data-infused mapping tools for its fund recipients (state
and local governments, and housing agencies) to use in measuring
residential segregation within their boundaries and developing strategies to
address it.310 The EPA has developed “smart location” maps, designed to
reveal block-by-block characteristics like proximity to jobs, transit options
and walkability, to encourage home seekers to make choices that lessen
greenhouse gas emissions and improve their health and access to
amenities.311
E.

A Path Forward

Demand-side subsidies can influence homeowner behavior. As discussed
throughout Part VI, if properly constructed, this can include encouraging
homeowner decisions that impose fewer negative housing externalities (and
create more positive ones). Rapid, recent advances in housing data,
analytics and planning make the prospect of smarter homeowner subsidies
increasingly more plausible.
So how to proceed? While each model discussed in Part VI.C has
potential advantages, the third would probably be the best starting point.
This is due to its flexibility. It is the most adaptable to community-bycommunity variations, can be integrated as a complement to other federal,
state and local programs that subsidize housing, and lends itself most easily
to experimentation and adjustment. In these ways, it holds the greatest
potential for “smarter” subsidy design in the way this article envisions.
Certain features are important to include if proceeding with the third
model. First, community or project-level homeowner subsidies should take
the form of homeowner grants or loans allocated through HUD, rather than
309
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as tax breaks provided through the Internal Revenue Code. HUD, after all,
is a housing agency. It has a great deal of experience allocating federal
funding in response to community planning processes that identify
localized funding needs. Just a few examples include the CDBG
program,312 the Neighborhood Stabilization Program,313 and the HOME
Investment Partnerships Program.314 The Internal Revenue Code, on the
other hand, is not a good vehicle for delivering on social policy with as
many moving parts as this would entail. Furthermore, there is a risk,
discussed at various points in Part VI.C., that highly tailored, community
specific subsidies delivered as tax breaks could violate the Uniformity
Clause of the U.S. Constitution or at least appear to do so.315
Second, local governments should serve as the applicants for and the
ultimate distributer of homeowner subsidies within their boundaries.
Congress and HUD would set the parameters for the housing objectives and
types of homeowner decisions that the subsidies could support, and these
would correlate closely with the negative housing externalities discussed
throughout this article. But local communities would identify the specific
instances in which they would deploy the subsidies.
For example, a city grappling with disinvestment might identify several
tipping point neighborhoods where an influx of new homeowners could
provide the foundation for stabilization and a turnaround. This city might
then propose in its application purchase grants for home buyers and local
property tax offset grants for existing homeowners. HUD standards might
additionally require that these grants advance (or at least not undermine)
residential integration and environmental objectives. In addition, a
community planning process should support the application for these types
of subsidies. This is similar to the design of already existing HUD programs
like CDBG, NSP and HOME.316 The basic premise is that HUD provides
oversight, but communities are given significant leeway in proposing the
best specific uses of the funds.
Third, given that this type of a subsidy model represents a significant
departure from the current model, it would be best initiated as a pilot
program, limited in scope and subject to review, until its merits are
demonstrated and its preliminary kinks are worked out. In addition,
312
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Congress should strongly consider making this program competitive in its
pilot phase in order to encourage innovation and to identify communities
with the capacity to succeed.
Federal agencies have significant recent experience launching new
funding programs in this manner. The second round of Neighborhood
Stabilization Program funding involved a competitive application process in
which local governments and nonprofit applicants had to demonstrate to
HUD that their proposed use of the funds would help to stabilize targeted
neighborhoods (while achieving a number of other objectives, including
environmental ones), resulted from a planning process and that they
possessed the capacity to carry it out.317 In a similar vein, the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided $4.35 billion for a
competitive grant fund for state plans that accomplished a broad range of
objectives related to improving educational outcomes, and might be used as
models for other states.318 This approach to funding has become a useful
method for spurring innovation and reform within the public sector, as local
actors are highly motivated by available funds to get creative in designing
plans capable of success. Ultimately, a pilot phase may reveal that it is
actually feasible and more efficient to allocate homeowner subsidies using
the first or second models, or that some type of hybrid model would work
best.
A pilot phase would also allow policymakers to determine the impact of
the third model on housing affordability and equity concerns. Smarter
homeowner subsidies, as discussed throughout this article, would involve
direct, selectively available subsidies to private individuals, the allocation
of which is influenced by data analytics, market factors, and local leaders
who are also focused on keeping or making their communities competitive.
This raises well-merited and significant concerns regarding housing access
and equity, especially as it relates to politically marginalized groups.
Congress should include standards and safeguards to address these
concerns, which HUD should be charged with implementing. Yet, it is
reasonable to expect that this will not be a perfect science, and will take
time.
A pilot model would make sense for another reason as well. It may match
best with the political challenges certain to follow from tackling reform as
charged as that involving the homeowner subsidies. As Part V discussed,
any effort at changing the current homeowner subsidies will encounter
immediate and stern resistance from the powerful interests benefiting from
317
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them. This resistance may include invoking, not without merit, the potential
for a drop in home prices that could result from a significant roll back of the
subsidies. A more politically feasible scenario for reform would involve an
incremental roll back of one or more of the current homeowner subsidies,
by lowering the existing caps on the amount of gain that qualifies for the
capital gains exclusion or the value of the mortgage or property that
qualifies for the MID or property tax deduction. Proceeding in this way
would primarily only affect the tax breaks of wealthy homeowners (and
only on a portion of their tax breaks), be unlikely to significantly disrupt
home prices and yield significant tax revenue for the federal government.319
A portion of this revenue could then be devoted to piloting smarter
homeowner subsidies.
It bears repeating here that the quest for smarter homeowner subsidies is
not a call for abandoning homeowner subsidies that seek to make
homeownership more affordable. The calls for more thoughtfully
constructed tax credits aimed at low and middle homeowners, in what Part
VI.A described as the second camp of proposals, is in a sense a smarter
homeowner subsidy as it relates to home affordability. The goal of this
article is not to work to the exclusion of this objective, but rather to
advocate for subsidy reform that is also smarter as it relates to negative
housing externalities. These two goals can and should be complementary.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The prospect of smarter homeowner subsidies is tantalizing. When
considering the sheer scale of what the federal government currently invests
in homeowner subsidies that inure primarily to the benefit of higher income
households and are completely insensitive to negative housing externalities,
it is difficult not to wonder what a more carefully considered system of
allocating subsidies might yield. If done right, a powerful tool could be
added to the mix of federal housing strategies.
At the same time, the challenges to successfully implementing smarter
subsidies on a nationwide basis are daunting, as this article identifies. In
earlier eras, the potential for inequities, inefficiencies and problems in
administration would likely have proven too difficult to overcome. Rapidly
advancing technology and corresponding increases in planning
sophistication at the community level should ultimately provide the
opportunity for the federal government to persevere and get a much better
319
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return on its massive investment in homeownership. Participation and
innovation at the community level in designing these subsidies would be
important catalysts to success.
VIII.

POSTSCRIPT—TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT OF 2017

In a year that challenged political convention in almost every respect, the
unexpected also happened with federal income tax reform. As this article
advanced through the final stages of the publication process, Congress
introduced, considered and passed a far-reaching package of changes to the
federal income tax code called the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (the
“Act”).320 The entire process took less than two months—warp speed by
Congressional standards, especially for tax reform.
As it relates to the homeowner subsidies, the Act represented a victory
for those this article described in Part VI.A as belonging to the first camp of
reformers. The Act approximately doubled the size of the standard
deduction, meaning millions of additional taxpayers will no longer itemize
deductions.321 This greatly reduces the number of those who will claim two
of the three principal homeowner subsidies: the mortgage interest deduction
and the deduction for state and local taxes.322 At the same time, the Act
reduced the amounts of mortgage interest and state and local taxes that are
deductible, and eliminated the MID for home equity debt (i.e. mortgage
financing used for purposes other than to acquire, construct, or substantially
improve a home).323 A primary goal of the Act’s proponents was to reduce
320
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321
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long-standing tax expenditures in order to pay for across the board
corporate and individual income tax rate reductions. This made the
homeowner subsidies an obvious target, although not all of the attempted
reductions of the subsidies succeeded.324
This is not to say that the homeowner subsidies are no longer relevant.
All three of the principal subsidies survived, and the exclusion of capital
gains on home sales did so entirely intact. The federal government will
continue to invest substantially in the homeowner subsidies,325 and it is
even possible the subsidies will return to their previous form in 2026 after
certain provisions of the Act expire. Because a smaller percentage of
taxpayers will itemize and a greater percentage of those that do will be in
the highest income brackets, an even greater percentage of the homeowner
subsidies will go to those who need no encouragement to purchase a
home.326
Most pertinent to this article is the question of whether the Act makes the
homeowner subsidies any smarter. The immediate response is “no.”
Proponents of the Act approached the homeowner subsidies principally as
opportunities for cost savings, rather than as housing policy tools, and
sought simply to reduce them as much as politically feasible. Knowing that,
it is difficult to assert that the reformed subsidies are any smarter except to
the extent that they do less to fuel certain homeowner behavior that
exacerbated negative housing externalities. This is not smarter design as
this article envisions it.327
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Looking toward the horizon, however, there may be room for hope.
Using a larger standard deduction and lower individual tax rates to blunt the
loss of the mortgage interest deduction for most claimants was perhaps the
only feasible way of loosening the decades long political stranglehold this
deduction has had on housing policy. Reducing reliance on what is
probably the least smart and certainly the most expensive of all of the
current homeowner subsidies may actually help to clear a path for smarter
subsidies if the political will to design and approve them can be mustered.
Time will tell.
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